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SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
S u p p l e m e n t a r y S t a t e m e n t of P r o c e e d i n g s 
1. By O r d e r d a t e d S e p t e m b e r 6, 1988, J u d g e Uno ' s A u g u s t 
4, 1988 O r d e r g r a n t i n g L a w y e r s T i t l e I n s u r a n c e C o r p o r a t i o n ' s 
("LTIC") Mot ion f o r Summary J u d g m e n t was e n t e r e d a s a f i n a l O r d e r 
and c e r t i f i e d a s an a p p e a l a b l e O r d e r u n d e r Utah R u l e of C i v i l 
P r o c e d u r e 54 (b ) . 
2 . On O c t o b e r 5, 1988# Tower F e d e r a l S a v i n g s and Loan 
("TFSL") f i l e d a t i m e l y N o t i c e of A p p e a l from J u d g e Uno ' s S e p t e m b e r 
6, 1988 O r d e r . R. 9 5 6 5 - 9 5 6 8 . 
3 . On O c t o b e r 20, 1988, LTIC f i l e d an u n t i m e l y N o t i c e of 
C r o s s A p p e a l from J u d g e Uno ' s S e p t e m b e r 6, 1988 O r d e r . R. 
9 5 7 0 - 9 5 7 2 . 
S u p p l e m e n t a r y S t a t e m e n t of F a c t 
1. Be tween t h e i s s u a n c e of t h e P r e l i m i n a r y T i t l e R e p o r t 
and t h e T i t l e P o l i c y , TFSL c o n t i n u e d t o r e l y upon t h e a c c u r a c y of 
t h e P r e l i m i n a r y T i t l e R e p o r t w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e s t a t u s of t i t l e 
and l i e n r e c o r d . EXHIBIT AA - D e p o s i t i o n of J e f f r e y K. Woodbury, 
p p . 23 , 6 1 - 6 6 , 103 & 104, R. 8 3 2 8 - 8 4 7 9 ; EXHIBIT BB - D e p o s i t i o n of 
A u g u s t F. B r a n d , p p . 4 9 - 5 1 , R. 8 3 2 8 - 8 4 7 9 ; and EXHIBIT CC -
D e p o s i t i o n of E. E a r l A u t e n r e i t h , p p . 30, 5 2 - 5 8 & 144, R. 
8 3 2 8 - 8 4 7 9 . 
2 . As an a l t e r n a t i v e t o o b t a i n i n g a t i t l e u p d a t e b e f o r e 
f u n d i n g and r e c o r d a t i o n of l o a n i n s t r u m e n t s f o r TFSL, J e f f r e y 
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Woodbury was furnished with a verbal update from Timothy Krueger, 
LTIC's agent, assuring that, at the time of issuance of the Title 
Policy, everybody, including TFSL, remained in the same position as 
reported on the Preliminary Title Report. EXHIBIT AA - Deposition 
of Jeffrey K. Woodbury, pp. 23, 61-66, R. 8328-8479. 
3. TFSL's agent, Jeffrey Woodbury, relied on verbal 
assurances of Timothy Krueger regarding the status of title and 
liens in issuing escrow instructions to Timothy Krueger with 
respect to the prerequisites to funding and recordation of TFSL's 
loan instruments. EXHIBIT AA - Deposition of Jeffrey K. Woodbury, 
pp. 61-66, R. 8328-8479; and EXHIBIT DD - March 18, 1985 letter 
from Jeffrey K. Woodbury to Richmond Title Company (Exhibit E to 
Woodbury deposition) R. 8328-8479. 
4. Timothy Krueger executed the escrow instructions, 
acknowledging that the loan instruments were to be recorded only if 
the status of the title conformed to that set forth on the 
preliminary title report. EXHIBIT AA - Deposition of Jeffrey K. 
Woodbury, pp. 61-66, R. 8328-8479; and EXHIBIT EE - Deposition of 
Timothy Alan Krueger, pp. 53-61, R. 9612 and 9623. 
5. Timothy Krueger believed he had a duty to report 
unsatisfied liens to TFSL before funding and/or recordation of the 
TFSL instruments. EXHIBIT EE - Deposition of Timothy Alan Krueger, 
pp. 67-74, R. 9612 & 9623. 
6. Liens of record existed at the time of funding and 
recordation of the TFSL instruments which were not reported to 
TFSL. See Statement of Facts, para. 26 of Brief of Appellant. 
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7. Mechanics ' l i e n s would have s i gn i f i ed t r o u b l e with 
t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o j e c t and TFSL would no t have c losed a n d / o r 
funded t h e loan i f i t had known of t h e u n r e p o r t e d l i e n s . EXHIBIT 
AA - Deposi t ion of J e f f r ey K. Woodbury, pp . 61-66, 103 & 104, R. 
8328-8479; EXHIBIT BB - Deposi t ion of August F. Brand, pp . 49-51 , 
R. 8328-8479; and EXHIBIT CC - Deposi t ion of E. Ea r l Au ten re i t h , 
pp . 30, 52-58, 136 & 144, R. 8328-8479. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Originally, TFSL asserted Cfossclaims against LTIC 
sounding in Negligence, Misrepresentation and Fraud. On December 
28, 1987, the lower Court dismissed the tort claims, citing Beck v. 
Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). The Court held 
that the Beck decision required claims of the type asserted by TFSL 
against LTIC to be brought in the form of or concurrently with 
breach of contract claims, but not as independent tort claims. 
Thereafter, the lower Court granted TFSL's Motion to Amend and 
permitted TFSL's Third Amended Crossclaim to be filed and served on 
LTIC. The Third Amended Crossclaim included causes of action for 
Breach of Contact, Negligent Misrepresentation and Breach of the 
Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. LTIC brought a Motion for 
Summary Judgment against TFSL on the referenced claims at the 
conclusion of discovery. 
In this appeal, TFSL asserts that, not only has it stated 
good causes of action for breach of contract and breach of the duty 
of good faith and fair dealing, but that it has satisfied all 
requirements of the Beck decision in setting forth both those 
claims and its claim for negligent misrepresentation. It is clear 
that LTIC has abandoned its legal argument that TFSL has failed to 
assert a cognizable cause of action under Beck, thereby tacitly 
acknowledging that TFSL has pled good causes of action against 
LTIC. 
The thrust of LTIC's arguments on appeal is that TFSL 
cannot identify disputed issues of material fact related to the 
- 5 -
causes of action i t has se t forth against LTIC. A careful 
examination of LTIC's arguments, in connection with those se t forth 
by TFSL and the testimony of witnesses referenced by both pa r t i e s 
readily demonstrates t h a t s ignif icant disputed material i ssues of 
fact ex is t with respec t to TFSI/s claims against LTIC, for which 
reason summary judgment in the lower Court was inappropria te . This 
Court should reverse the lower Court 's decision and remand the case 
to the lower Court for t r i a l of TFSL's claims against LTIC. 
In i t s Cross Appeal, LTIC asse r t s t h a t the lower Court 
erred by denying summary judgment with respect to i t s claims for 
costs and reasonable a t torney ' s fees against TFSL, on the bas is 
t h a t i t bel ieves TFSL's Third Amended Crossclaim i s without merit 
and not brought in good fai th . In addition, LTIC se t s forth a 
claim under Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court for 
damages, on the bas is t h a t i t bel ieves TFSL's claims and Appeal t o 
have been fr ivolous. Rule 4(d) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court c lear ly s t a t e s t h a t a Cross Appeal must brought within 14 
days of an Appeal by another par ty to a lower Court decision. 
Because untimely f i led, t h i s Court i s without ju r i sd ic t ion to 
consider LTIC's Cross Appeal and i t must be dismissed. In 
addition, given the fact t ha t LTIC's Appeal was obviously untimely, 
t he re clear ly ex i s t s no reasonable basis in law for the Cross 
Appeal, for which reason i t is frivolous and TFSL is ent i t led to 
damages under Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
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ARGUMENTS 
I . LTIC HAS ABANDONED ITS LEGAL ARGUMENT THAT TFSL HAS FAILED 
TO ASSERT A COGNIZABLE CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER BECK V. FARMERS INS, 
EXCHANGE. 701 P. 2d 795 (Utah 1985) , THEREBY TACITLY ACKNOWLEDGING 
THAT TFSL HAS PLED GOOD CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST LTIC. 
T h r o u g h o u t t h e l i t i g a t i o n b e t w e e n TFSL and LTIC in t h e 
l o w e r C o u r t , b o t h LTIC and t h e l o w e r C o u r t r e l i e d h e a v i l y upon t h e 
a r g u m e n t t h a t TFSL ' s c l a i m s a g a i n s t LTIC w e r e n o t c o g n i z a b l e u n d e r 
t h e Beck d e c i s i o n . I n f a c t , one of t h e b a s e s upon which t h e l o w e r 
C o u r t g r a n t e d summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r of LTIC was t h a t TFSL was 
r e q u i r e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e b r e a c h of c o n t r a c t u a l d u t i e s b e f o r e any 
o t h e r c a u s e of a c t i o n c o u l d b e a s s e r t e d a g a i n s t LTIC. I n m a t e r i a l 
p a r t , i t i s from t h a t d e c i s i o n which TFSL f i l e d i t s A p p e a l i n t h i s 
m a t t e r . 
I n i t s B r i e f i n O p p o s i t i o n t o T F S L ' s A p p e a l , LTIC d o e s n o t 
a d d r e s s t h e l e g a l p r o p r i e t y of TFSL ' s c l a i m s a g a i n s t i t u n d e r 
Beck. From a r e v i e w of LTIC ' s Br ie f , i t i s a p p a r e n t t h a t LTIC h a s 
a b a n d o n e d s u c h an a r g u m e n t , t h e r e b y t a c i t l y a d m i t t i n g t h e l e g a l 
p r o p r i e t y of TFSL ' s c a u s e s of a c t i o n u n d e r t h e Beck d e c i s i o n . 
R a t h e r t h a n a t t a c k t h e l e g a l p r o p r i e t y of TFSL ' s c l a i m s , LTIC 
d e v o t e s i t s e n t i r e B r i e f i n O p p o s i t i o n t o a r g u m e n t s t h a t TFSL h a s 
f a i l e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e m a t e r i a l f a c t u a l d i s p u t e s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e 
c a u s e s of a c t i o n a s s e r t e d . 
As more f u l l y s e t f o r t h i n i t s i n i t i a l B r i e f , TFSL 
m a i n t a i n s t h a t a f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m w i t h J u d g e Uno ' s d e c i s i o n i s 
t h a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of law t h a t j u d g m e n t was w a r r a n t e d i n f a v o r of 
LTIC n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e d t h e C o u r t t o make f i n d i n g s of f a c t . An 
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examinat ion of J u d g e Uno's Memorandum Decision and t h e p o i n t s 
a d d r e s s e d by LTIC in i t s Brief in Opposi t ion t o TFSL's Appeal 
r e v e a l s t h e fol lowing c r u c i a l f i nd ings of f a c t which a r e d i spu t ed 
by TFSL: 
(1) TFSL's damages were not caused by any b r each 
of LTIC, bu t by Buildmart Mall ' s d e f a u l t ; 
(2) That TFSL was not in a second l i e n p o s i t i o n 
was no t LTIC's f a u l t ; 
(3) Under e i t h e r a b reach of c o n t r a c t o r f raud 
t h e o r y , TFSL cannot meet i t s burden of proof; 
and 
(4) TFSL h a s fa i led t o p roduce ev idence of 
m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s by LTIC. 
The r e c o r d in t h i s case c l e a r l y r e f l e c t s t h a t t h e Court had t o 
d i s r e g a r d ev idence of record in s u p p o r t of TFSL's c la ims in o r d e r 
t o reach t h e s e f a c t u a l f i nd ings . Witnesses t e s t i f i e d t h a t TFSL 
would not have ex tended t h e loan if i t had known of t h e und isc losed 
mechanics ' l i e n s . Thus, t h e Cour t ' s f i n d i n g s with r e s p e c t t o 
c a u s a t i o n of TFSL's damages, a proximate cause q u e s t i o n , should not 
have been de termined by t h e Court by summary judgment . Likewise, 
t h e q u e s t i o n whether LTIC was a t f a u l t fo r TFSL no t being in a 
second l i e n p o s i t i o n i s a ques t ion for t h e f ac t f i n d e r and should 
not have been de te rmined by t h e Court by summary judgment . In 
f ac t , t h e q u e s t i o n i s i r r e l e v a n t based upon t h e t e s t imony t h a t TFSL 
would no t have ex tended t h e loan under t h e c i r cums t ances l a t e r 
d i s c o v e r e d . As a r e s u l t , a f inding of f a u l t with r e s p e c t t o TFSL's 
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l i e n p o s i t i o n i s i m m a t e r i a l t o i t s c l a i m s a g a i n s t LTIC. Whe the r 
TFSL met i t s b u r d e n u n d e r e i t h e r a b r e a c h of c o n t r a c t o r f r a u d 
t h e o r y r e q u i r e d t h e C o u r t t o e x a m i n e f a c t s and t o r e a c h f a c t u a l 
c o n c l u s i o n s , which s h o u l d h a v e o c c u r r e d a t t i m e of t r i a l , r a t h e r 
t h a n a t t h e summary j u d g m e n t s t a g e . The a l l e g a t i o n s of TFSL i n i t s 
T h i r d Amended C r o s s c l a i m w e r e more t h a n a d e q u a t e l y e s t a b l i s h e d by 
d i s c o v e r y a d d u c e d i n t h i s m a t t e r a n d , i n p a r t , s e t f o r t h i n TFSL ' s 
S t a t e m e n t of t h e c a s e and S u p p l e m e n t a r y S t a t e m e n t of t h e c a s e . 
F i n a l l y , TFSL c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e d f a c t s i n d i s c o v e r y s u p p o r t i n g i t s 
a s s e r t i o n t h a t a d u t y e x i s t e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e d e a l i n g s b e t w e e n 
t h e p a r t i e s . The t e s t i m o n y and a c t i o n s of T imothy K r u e g e r , more 
p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s c r i b e d l a t e r i n t h i s Br i e f , e s t a b l i s h t h a t d u t i e s 
t o TFSL w e r e b r e a c h e d by i t s a g e n t a n d , b a s e d upon TFSL ' s 
w i t n e s s e s 1 t e s t i m o n y , c a u s e d s u b s t a n t i a l d a m a g e s t o TFSL. Fo r 
t h e s e r e a s o n s , J u d g e Uno ' s O r d e r g r a n t i n g summary j u d g m e n t in f a v o r 
of LTIC m u s t b e r e v e r s e d . 
I I . LTIC'S ARGUMENTS THAT TFSL HAS FAILED TO PLEAD AND 
IDENTIFY FACTS TO SUPPORT BREACH OF CONTRACT AND TORT CLAIMS 
DEMONSTRATE THE DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS MAKING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
INAPPROPRIATE. 
The m a j o r i t y of LTIC ' s B r i e f in O p p o s i t i o n t o TFSL ' s 
A p p e a l i s d e v o t e d t o e f f o r t s t o c o n v i n c e t h e C o u r t t h a t summary 
j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r of LTIC was a p p r o p r i a t e b e c a u s e TFSL a l l e g e d l y 
f a i l e d t o p l e a d and d e m o n s t r a t e f a c t s t o s u p p o r t i t s b r e a c h of 
c o n t r a c t and t o r t c l a i m s a g a i n s t LTIC. LTIC ' s a r g u m e n t s a r e 
c a t e g o r i c a l l y d i v i d e d i n t o s e c t i o n s a d d r e s s i n g T F S L ' s b r e a c h of 
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contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and 
negligent misrepresentation claims, respectively. Each will be 
addressed in this Reply. 
LTIC argues that TFSL has no breach of contract claims 
because: 
(1) TFSL had no privity of contract with Lawyers 
Title with respect to the Preliminary Title 
Report; 
(2) The liens that TFSL alleged LTIC failed to 
disclose in the Preliminary Title Report were 
recorded after the Preliminary Title Report 
was issued; and 
(3) TFSL has not cited to any facts in the record 
showing a breach of any express contractual 
obligation by LTIC to TFSL. 
LTIC cites the cases of Hooper v. Coin, Land Title Ins. 
Co., 285 Pa. Super. 265, 427 A.2d 215 (1981) and Gaines v. 
American Title Ins. Co., 136 Ga. App. 162, 220 S.E. 2d 469 (1975) 
for the proposition that TFSL has no claim against LTIC because it 
was not in privity with LTIC with respect to the Preliminary Title 
Report. The cases cited are inapposite to the instant case. In 
Hooper, the issue raised was whether a contract was intended for 
the benefit of a third party, which the Court believed to be a 
question of construction. To resolve the question, the Court 
commented that the intention of a party would be determined by the 
terms of the contract as a whole, construed in the light of the 
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circumstances under which i t was made. Since the claim asserted 
against the t i t l e i n su re r was by a t h i rd par ty to the contract , 
the Court concluded t h a t no duty arose other than to the insured. 
Similar t o Hooper, the Court in Gaines considered the 
duty of an insure r with respect to a par ty outside the t i t l e 
insurance contract . In addition to concluding t h a t t he r e was no 
p r iv i ty of contrac t which would permit the t h i rd par ty to asser t a 
claim under the cont rac t , the Court found tha t , because no fraud 
or misrepresentat ion was shown, the insure r could not be held 
l iab le t o the t h i rd pa r ty . 
In t h i s case, LTIC continues to attempt to avoid 
l i ab i l i t y t o TFSL by asser t ing t h a t the Preliminary Ti t le Report 
was given to Richards-Woodbury r a the r t h a t TFSL. This argument 
fa i l s for two reasons. F i rs t , LTIC knew or became aware during 
the time i t was processing the Preliminary Ti t le Report and up to 
the time t h e Ti t le Policy was issued t h a t TFSL would take the 
referenced loan by assignment from Richards-Woodbury and therefore 
would rely on both the Preliminary Ti t le Report and the Tit le 
Policy. See general ly Deposition of Timothy Alan Krueger. 
Second, t he Utah Supreme Court has held t h a t a claim for negligent 
misrepresentat ion does not depend upon pr iv i ty of cont rac t . 
In Dugan v. Jones, 615 P. 2d 1239 (Utah 1980), th i rd 
par ty p la in t i f f s were rea l es ta te purchasers who had been told by 
the t h i rd par ty defendant, a rea l e s t a t e agent, t h a t property they 
were purchasing comprised 22.75 acres , when in fact, i t comprised 
only 6.9 acres . The Utah Supreme Court held t h a t a claim for 
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negligent misrepresentat ion did l i e in t o r t against t h e r ea l to r 
even though he was not in p r iv i ty with the purchasers . See also 
Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc. , 713 
P. 2d 55 (Utah 1986). 
Upon consideration of appeals from post t r i a l Motions in 
Price-Orem, the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged t h a t Utah 
recognized the t o r t of negligent misrepresentation and permitted 
th i rd pa r t i e s injured by reasonable rel iance upon the 
misrepresenting p a r t y ' s information t o sue for negligent 
misrepresentation regard less of p r iv i ty . Citing Jardine v. 
Brunswick Corp,, 423 P. 2d 659 (Utah 1967), the Utah Supreme Court 
s ta ted t h a t a par ty injured by reasonable rel iance upon a second 
pa r ty ' s care less or negl igent misrepresentation of a material fact 
may recover damages resu l t ing from t h a t injury when the second 
party had a pecuniary i n t e r e s t in the t ransac t ion , was in a 
superior posit ion to know the material facts , and should have 
reasonably foreseen t h a t the injured par ty was l ikely to rely upon 
the fac ts . Price-Orem, 713 P. 2d at 59 (ci ta t ions omitted). 
TFSL has suff icient ly identif ied testimony t o support i t s 
claims t h a t i t reasonably rel ied upon misinformation furnished by 
LTIC's agent, Timothy Krueger. Even though LTIC argues t ha t TFSL 
was not in p r iv i ty with LTIC as to the Preliminary Ti t le Report, 
TFSL's claims are permitted by Utah law. 
LTIC also argues tha t the l iens TFSL al leges LTIC failed 
to disclose were l i ens which arose af ter the Preliminary Tit le 
Report. However, LTIC ignores c r i t i c a l testimony of Messrs. 
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Woodbury, Autenreith, Brand and Krueger (LTIC's agent), tha t 
information regarding any l iens which arose p r io r t o the time tha t 
TFSI/s loan was funded, i t s loan instruments were recorded and the 
Ti t le Policy was issued was c r i t i c a l to TFSI/s determination to go 
forward with funding. 
Jeffrey Woodbury t e s t i f i ed tha t , although he did not 
obtain the wri t ten t i t l e update he requested before TFSI/s loan 
was funded and i t s loan instruments were recorded, he was verbally 
assured by Timothy Krueger t h a t the s t a t e of the t i t l e remained 
the same a t t he time of closing as i t was reported in the 
Preliminary Ti t le Report. Further , Mr. Woodbury s ta ted t h a t i t 
was in re l iance upon such assurance t h a t he issued escrow 
ins t ruc t ions t o Timothy Krueger with respect to funding TFSI/s 
loan and the recordation of i t s loan instruments . Despite LTIC's 
agreement t o t he contrary (by Mr. Krueger), those escrow 
ins t ruc t ions were violated because they required t h a t the loan be 
funded only under t he agreed circumstances. Since the s ta te of 
t i t l e differed from t h a t set forth in the Preliminary Ti t le Report 
and from the oral assurances of Mr. Krueger, t he loan should never 
have been funded. Finally, Mr. Woodbury t e s t i f i ed t h a t he would 
not have closed the loan or advanced loan proceeds without the 
assured l ien posit ion and, when asked why, he t e s t i f i ed "I would 
have advised TFSL t h a t i t ' s crazy to close t h i s , because these 
people don' t have t he money r igh t now to handle ongoing problems 
t h a t are probably g rea te r than the amount of the debt.11 EXHIBIT AA 
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- Deposition of Jeffrey K. Woodbury, pp. 23, 61-66, 103 & 104. R. 
8328-8479. 
Messrs. Brand and Autenreith t e s t i f i ed similarly tha t , 
had TFSL and/or Richards-Woodbury known of mechanic l ien problems, 
the loan would not have been closed. Both witnesses t es t i f i ed 
t ha t the knowledge of those l iens , despi te mechanics' l ien 
insurance, would have caused concern regarding the pro jec t ' s 
s t ab i l i t y . EXHIBIT BB - Deposition of August F. Brand, pp. 49-51, 
R. 8328-8479; EXHIBIT CC - Deposition of E. Earl Autenreith, pp. 
30, 52-58, 136 & 144, R. 8328-8479. Mr. Krueger t e s t i f i ed t ha t i t 
was his understanding t h a t he should have recorded the Deed of 
Trust and funded the loan only if the re were no exceptions in the 
Tit le Policy other than those ident i f ied ' on the Preliminary Tit le 
Report and tha t , in the event the re were intervening unsat isf ied 
l iens , he was obligated to repor t them to Jeffrey Woodbury before 
funding the loan. EXHIBIT EE - Deposition of Timothy Alan 
Krueger, pp. 53-61, 67-75 & 112. The March 18, 1985 escrow 
ins t ruc t ions directed t h a t TFSL's loan was not to be funded or i t s 
loan instruments recorded unless TFSL was in the t i t l e position 
represented in the Preliminary Tit le Report. Regardless of 
whether the l iens about which TFSL complains existed when the 
Preliminary Ti t le Report was issued, i t was LTIC's agent ' s fa i lure 
to disclose the l iens of record through the time of funding which 
caused TFSL's loan to be funded and Timothy Krueger's 
misrepresentation t h a t they did not exis t which resul ted in TFSL's 
losses. 
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LTIC argues t h a t TFSL can identify no breach of any 
express contrac tual obligation by LTIC. In support of t h i s 
argument, LTIC addresses the cases of Brown/s Tie and Lumber v. 
Chicago Ti t le , 115 Idaho 56, 764 P. 2d 423 (1988) and Anderson v. 
Ti t le Ins . Co., 103 Idaho 875, 655 P. 2d 82 (1982). However, the 
cases ci ted by LTIC are inapposi te . Admittedly, both cases deal 
with s i tua t ions in which the Court ult imately determined t h a t no 
negligence l i ab i l i t y would be imposed against the t i t l e insurer 
involved. However, both cases were also based upon the fact t ha t 
no dut ies were assumed by the insure r in addition to the contract 
t o insure t i t l e . In t h i s case, LTIC, by i t s agent, assumed and 
breached t h e following dut ies : (1) t o accurately search and 
repor t the s t a t e of the t i t l e ; and (2) t o comply with escrow 
ins t ruc t ions executed and acknowledged by i t s agent, t h a t i t would 
not fund the loan or record TFSL's loan instruments if the s t a te 
of the t i t l e a t the time of issuance of the Tit le Policy differed 
from tha t se t forth in the Preliminary Ti t le Report. TFSL has 
clearly s ta ted and LTIC's own agent ' s testimony supports a claim 
for breach of contract . 
LTIC also argues t h a t i t did not breach any implied 
covenant of good fai th and fa i r dealing since TFSL got what i t 
bargained for, a Ti t le Policy. As set forth above, LTIC ignores 
i t s agent ' s fa i lures with respect to the agreement to search and 
accurately repor t t i t l e information and, more importantly, i t s 
agent 's fa i lure to comply with escrow ins t ruc t ions which required 
t h a t the s t a t e of the t i t l e a t issuance of the Ti t le Policy be the 
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same as t h a t set forth in the Preliminary Ti t le Report. Had 
accurate information been reported, no loan would have been 
extended and TFSL would have sustained no loss . TFSL has stated a 
claim for breach of LTIC's implied duty of good fai th and fair 
dealing. 
LTIC argues t h a t TFSI/s claim of negligent 
misrepresentation fa i l s as a matter of law because t he re is no 
evidence of misrepresentation and the re was no duty on LTIC to 
abs t rac t t i t l e . LTIC contends t h a t the Preliminary Ti t le Report 
and Ti t le Policy only purport t o s t a t e the bases upon which t i t l e 
would be and was insured. Once again, LTIC ignores the dut ies 
assumed by i t s agent, Timothy Krueger, t o accurately examine and 
repor t the s t a t e of the t i t l e and, at a minimum, to comply with 
escrow ins t ruc t ions he admittedly executed and acknowledged. 
There i s no question t h a t Mr. Krueger, by assuring Mr. Woodbury 
tha t the s t a t e of the t i t l e when the Ti t le Policy was issued was 
the same as t ha t se t forth in the Preliminary Ti t le Report, 
misrepresented c r i t i c a l information. 
The cases ci ted by LTIC to support i t s contention tha t i t 
had no duty to abs t r ac t t i t l e are d is t inguishable . In Amer. F i rs t 
Abstract v. Western Info. Syst., 735 P.2d 1187 (Okla. 1987), the 
Court merely addressed whether the defendant company which 
compiled information from the public record was an abs t rac tor of 
t i t l e . The case does not support the proposit ion t h a t LTIC cannot 
be l iab le for fail ing to accurately repor t the s t a t e of the 
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t i t l e . In Horn v. Lawyers Ti t le Ins, Co., 89 N.M. 709, 557 P.2d 
206 (1976), since t h e r e was no t o r t claim asser ted, t he Court 
looked to t he cont rac t for du t ies assumed by the insure r . Unlike 
Horn, in the i n s t an t case, a t o r t claim was asser ted, claims for 
breach of du t ies beyond those se t forth in the Ti t le Policy were 
asser ted and t h e information contained in LTIC's r epor t s was 
produced t o TFSL. 
The cases of Stone v. Lawyers Ti t le Ins . Corp., 537 S.W. 
2d 55 (Tex. 1976) and Prendergast v. Southern Tit le Guar. Co., 454 
S.W. 2d 803 (Tex. 1970), involved s i tua t ions not applicable here, 
where the insurer assumed no duty to examine t i t l e . The case of 
Jarchow v. Transamerica Tit le Ins . Co., 38 Cal. App. 3d 917, 122 
Cal. Rptr. 470 (1975) and i t s progeny involved s i tua t ions where 
the Court imposed l i ab i l i t y on t i t l e insu re r s for negligently 
examining and repor t ing the s t a t e of t i t l e . An important 
d is t inc t ion between these cases and the ins t an t case is t h a t those 
cases involved s i tua t ions where the fact f inder had an opportunity 
to consider t he issue of rel iance on the repor t , which opportunity 
was not permitted in the ins tan t case. 
In Transamerica Ti t le Ins . Co. v. Johnson, 103 Wash. 2d 
409, 693 P„2d 697 (1985), rel ied upon by LTIC at Page 38 of i t s 
Brief, the Court s ta ted t h a t the re was no dispute the t i t l e 
company was negl igent but determined tha t , absent a duty to the 
vendor (not the insured) , no l i ab i l i t y would be imposed. Summary 
judgment was granted because the record was devoid of any evidence 
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to support the contention t ha t t he re was any expectation of an 
obligation running from the t i t l e company t o the se l l e r . In the 
ins tan t case, the record before the Dis t r ic t Court establ ished 
LTIC's du t ies both with respect t o accurate search and repor t of 
the s t a t e of t i t l e and also compliance with escrow ins t ruc t ions 
before funding of TFSL's loan and recordation of i t s loan 
instruments . Transamerica provides t h a t a t r i a l i s required where 
such evidence ex i s t s . 
LTIC's ef for ts t o d is t inguish the Ford v. Guarantee 
Abstract and Ti t le Co,. 220 Kan. 244, 553 P.2d 254 (1976) and 
Moore v. Ti t le Ins . Co. of Min.. 148 Ariz. 408 714 P.2d 1303 
(1985) cases are ineffectual . LTIC says the Ford case i s 
d is t inguishable because the t i t l e company assumed dut ies beyond 
those of a t i t l e in su re r for disbursement of p l a in t i f f ' s monies 
and t h a t the Court imposed l i ab i l i t y because the t i t l e company 
failed to take s teps to insure t h a t the monies would be correct ly 
applied. The factual scenario in Ford i s not s ignif icant ly 
dissimilar to the negligent conduct of Timothy Krueger, LTIC's 
agent, in the in s t an t case. Testimony clearly supports TFSL's 
claim t h a t i t s loan should not have been funded and i t s loan 
instruments should not have been recorded without s t r i c t 
compliance with the escrow ins t ruc t ions executed and acknowledged 
by Timothy Krueger and tha t , had compliance occurred and TFSL been 
advised of the unreported mechanics' l iens , no monies would have 
been extended to Buildmart Mall and no loss sustained by TFSL. 
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LTIC attempts t o dis t inguish Moore on the bas i s t h a t the 
p la in t i f f s in Moore did not rely on the t i t l e information. Moore 
demonstrates the c r i t i c a l point raised by TFSL on appeal. The 
Moore Court found t h a t the pla int i f f had a r igh t to rely on the 
preliminary t i t l e repor t but tha t , a f ter t r i a l on the merits, no 
l i ab i l i t y existed because the pla in t i f f did not re ly on the 
repor t . In the ins t an t case, TFSL has demonstrated t h a t i t rel ied 
on information furnished by LTIC in the Preliminary Ti t le Report, 
through the time the Ti t le Policy was issued. Unfortunately, TFSL 
has been wrongfully denied i t s opportunity to t r y the issue of 
re l iance. 
LTIC concludes i t s argument t h a t i t had no duty to search 
t i t l e with the legal conclusion t h a t t i t l e insurance companies in 
Utah have no duty to search a t i t l e p r io r to issuing a policy and 
suggest t h a t no such duty be created. LTIC's conclusion f l ies in 
the face of t h i s Court 's decision in the case of Bush v. Coultt 
594 P.2d 865 (Utah 1979) t ha t t i t l e insurance cont rac ts are 
warrant ies and t h a t the insurer has the duty to repor t the s ta te 
of the t i t l e . As se t forth in TFSL's or ig inal Brief, t h i s Court, 
c i t ing with approval a New York Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal's 
decision, s ta ted t h a t , f[u]sually, the very purpose and essence of 
the t i t l e insurance t ransac t ion i s to obtain a professional t i t l e 
search, opinion and guarantee." Bush, 594 P.2d at 867 ci t ing. 
Empire Development Co. v. Tit le Guar. & Trust Co.. 225 N.Y. 53, 
121 N.E. 468 (1918) (emphasis added). This Court concluded tha t 
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, f[t]he law imposes no duty upon one who seeks t i t l e insurance to 
perform the respons ib i l i ty of t he insurer t o ascer ta in the s t a t e 
of the t i t l e . " Bush, 594 P.2d at 877 (emphasis added). 
LTIC argues t h a t the re i s no evidence of record t h a t TFSL 
rel ied on the Preliminary Tit le Report and/or Ti t le Policy and 
t h a t any such re l iance was unjust i f ied. In support of i t s 
argument, LTIC makes the brash statement t h a t the only evidence 
offered by TFSL are c i ta t ions t o the deposi t ions of Messrs. 
Woodbury, Brand and Autenreith which "contain nothing more than 
se l f - serv ing and conclusory statements." TFSL suggests t h a t most 
evidence adduced by a party to support i t s posi t ion may well be 
character ized as "se l f -serving." This i s why "disputed issues of 
material fact", such as the reasonable re l iance i ssue in the 
ins tan t case, a r i s e . I t i s inappropr ia te t o summarily dismiss 
such d isputes . Rather, i t i s for the jury to assess the 
c red ib i l i ty of witnesses offering confl ict ing testimony on such 
material i s sues . 
To support i t s argument t h a t TFSL did not jus t i f iably 
rely upon the Preliminary Ti t le Report and Ti t le Policy, LTIC 
refers t h i s Court t o the cases of Moore v. Ti t le Insurance Ins . 
Co. of Minn,, 148 Ariz. 408, 714 P.2d 1303 (1985) and Groswird v. 
Hayne Investment, Inc. , 184 Cal. Rptr. 123 (Cal. App. 1982). In 
fact, TFSL bel ieves t h a t these cases support i t s posit ion ra ther 
than the posit ion of LTIC. 
As more par t i cu la r ly se t forth above, the Court 's 
determination in the Moore case hinged upon t r i a l of the issue of 
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rel iance upon the Ti t le Report. While the Court found in favor 
of the insurer , i t did so only af ter t r i a l and held t h a t the 
insured had a r igh t t o rely on the report , but t h a t the jury 
found t h a t the Plaint i ff had not rel ied on the repor t . TFSL 
seeks the same opportunity to present i t s position to a jury . 
The Groswird Court applied a "but for" t e s t to analyze a claim 
against a t i t l e i n su re r and indicated t ha t l i ab i l i t y would not be 
imposed unless the injury alleged by the plaint i f f would not have 
been suffered but for the in su re r ' s negligence. This i s 
precisely the point which TFSL has maintained throughout t h i s 
l i t iga t ion . TFSL maintains t ha t but for the negligence and 
breach of contract by LTIC, i t would not have approved Buildmart 
Mall's loan request , would not have funded the loan and would not 
have sustained any loss . 
LTIC's references to testimony given on the rel iance 
issue are e i the r badly mischaracterized or intent ional ly 
misleading. As an example, LTIC refers to testimony of Timothy 
Krueger a t Page 74 of Volume II of his deposition t h a t no one 
from Richards-Woodbury or Tower ever requested information from 
him with regard to t he existence of any l iens on the insured 
property other than as se t forth in the Preliminary Ti t le Report 
and Ti t le Policy. LTIC then proceeds to refer to a portion of 
Jeffrey Woodbury's testimony indicating t h a t he did not review 
the Tower policy un t i l af ter the loan closed and funded. 
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However, on Page 71 of the t r a n s c r i p t of Mr. Krueger's deposition, 
the following quest ions appear: 
Question. Did you consider as pa r t of your 
r e spons ib i l i t i e s in wri t ing the t i t l e policy to 
repor t t h e existence of l i ens as of March 20, 1985 
t o Richards-Woodbury or anyone else? 
Answer. Certainly the recording would not have 
gone on record if t h i s were in effect. 
. . . 
Question . . . If they were valid l i ens against 
the Buildmart Mall proper ty as of March 20, 1985 
t h a t had not been sa t i s f ied or taken care of, 
released in some manner acceptable to you, did you 
understand t h a t you had an obligation to repor t 
those? 
Answer. Certainly. 
Question. To whom would you have understood t h a t 
you would have reported those? 
Answer. Given the l e t t e r of ins t ruc t ion , to have 
to go to Jeff Woodbury, at l eas t Jeff Woodbury, 
probably the other pa r t i e s to the t ransac t ion too. 
In the t o t a l i t y of even the limited testimony referred to herein, 
i t i s c lear t h a t Mr. Krueger understood he had an obligation to 
repor t unreported l i ens to Jeff Woodbury, and t ha t LTIC's 
reference to the pa r t i cu la r question cited on Page 43 of t h e i r 
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Brief i s a b la tan t misrepresentation of t he t o t a l i t y of Mr. 
Krueger's testimony. 
An examination of Mr. Woodbury's testimony re f l ec t s the 
same mischaracterization and/or misrepresentat ion. Mr. Woodbury 
t es t i f i ed t h a t the reason he did not review the Tit le Policy un t i l 
af ter t he loan closed was tha t he had received a verbal update in 
the interim assuring him tha t the s t a t e of t i t l e was the same at 
the time the Ti t le Policy was to be issued as i t was in the 
Preliminary Ti t le Report. Although he had requested a writ ten 
repor t or update, he was sat isf ied with the verbal assurance given 
by LTIC's agent. Taken in connection with the testimony of 
Messrs. Autenreith and Brand t h a t the loan would never have closed 
had the re been any knowledge of the unreported l i ens , the 
testimony of Messrs. Krueger and Woodbury es tabl ish reasonable 
rel iance by TFSL on LTIC's misrepresentat ions of the s t a t e of 
t i t l e . 
LTIC also argues as i t did in the lower Court t h a t the 
proximate cause of TFSL/s damages was the foreclosure by F i r s t 
Security Bank and Buildmart Mall's default . Again, proximate 
cause i s an issue of fact rendering summary judgment 
inappropr ia te . 
In support of i t s conclusion t h a t the foreclosure and/or 
default were the proximate causes of TFSI/s damages, LTIC c i tes 
the case of Schuman v. Investors Tit le Ins . Co., 338 S.E. 2d 611 
(N.C. App. 1986). In Schuman, Deeds of Trust were not properly 
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recorded causing the pla int i f f to fal l outside the f i r s t l ien 
posit ion i t would otherwise have held, Schuman i s d is t inguishable 
because, even if t h e record t i t l e had been as i t was insured to 
be, the p la in t i f f would have been in the same posit ion. Plaintiff 
had executed a subordination agreement with another credi tor , such 
t h a t p l a in t i f f ' s l ien would have been subordinated regardless of 
the order of recording. As a resu l t , the Court concluded t h a t 
even if p l a in t i f f ' s deed of t r u s t had been properly recorded, i t 
would have been subordinated to a f i r s t l ien posit ion, and t h a t 
the pla int i f f had sustained no damages in the case as a r e su l t of 
the order of recording. 
In the in s t an t case, had TFSL not been assured of a 
second posit ion, i t would not have approved the loan, would not 
have funded the loan and would not have sustained any loss . The 
foreclosure r i sk i s i r r e l evan t and would not have arisen if the 
undisclosed mechanics' l iens had been identif ied because the loan 
would not have been extended or funded. 
Discovery in the ins tan t case adduced material facts 
supporting TFSL's breach of contract , breach of the duty of good 
faith and fa i r dealing and negligent misrepresentation claims 
which should have been submitted to a jury for determination. 
Summary judgment was inappropr ia te . Accordingly, summary judgment 
in favor of LTIC must be reversed and t h i s case remanded to the 
lower Court for t r i a l of TFSL's claims against LTIC. 
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I I I . LTIC'S APPEAL WAS UNTIMELY, FOR WHICH REASON THE COURT IS 
WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER LTIC'S CROSS APPEAL IN THIS MATTER 
AND TFSL IS ENTITLED TO SANCTIONS UNDER RULE 33(a) OF THE RULES OF 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
Utah Sup reme C o u r t Ru le 4(d) p r o v i d e s : 
[i]f a t i m e l y N o t i c e of A p p e a l i s f i l e d by a 
p a r t y , any o t h e r p a r t y may f i l e a N o t i c e of A p p e a l 
w i t h i n 14 d a y s a f t e r t h e d a t e on which t h e f i r s t 
N o t i c e of A p p e a l was f i l e d . 
TFSL ' s t i m e l y N o t i c e of A p p e a l was f i l e d w i t h t h e C o u r t on O c t o b e r 
5, 1989. LTIC ' s u n t i m e l y A p p e a l was f i l e d w i t h t h e C o u r t on 
O c t o b e r 20, 1989, more t h a n 14 d a y s from t h e d a t e of TFSL ' s 
A p p e a l . T h e r e can b e l i t t l e q u e s t i o n t h a t LTIC mus t h a v e known 
i t s A p p e a l was u n t i m e l y . Yet , LTIC made no r e q u e s t f o r an 
e x t e n s i o n of t i m e and h a s c o n t i n u e d t o p u r s u e i t s c l a i m s u n d e r t h e 
u n t i m e l y a p p e a l . 
T h i s C o u r t h a s r e p e a t e d l y h e l d t h a t i t i s d e p r i v e d of 
a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n w h e r e an A p p e a l was u n t i m e l y f i l e d . Peay 
v . P e a v . 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980) ; B u r g e r s v . Maiben , 652 P.2d 
1320 (Utah 1982); a n d I s s a c s o n v . D o r i u s . 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 
1983) . T h e r e i s no q u e s t i o n t h a t t h i s C o u r t mus t d i s r e g a r d LTIC ' s 
a p p e a l s i n c e i t l a c k s t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n n e c e s s a r y t o c o n s i d e r t h e 
a p p e a l . 
Utah Sup reme C o u r t Ru le 33(a) p r o v i d e s t h a t : 
[i]f t h e C o u r t s h a l l d e t e r m i n e t h a t a mot ion made 
o r a p p e a l t a k e n u n d e r t h e s e r u l e s i s e i t h e r 
f r i v o l o u s o r f o r d e l a y , i t s h a l l award j u s t 
d a m a g e s and s i n g l e o r d o u b l e c o s t s , i n c l u d i n g 
r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s , t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g 
p a r t y . 
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The c a s e of Eames v . Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah App. 1987), d e f i n e d 
f r i v o l o u s a s one h a v i n g no r e a s o n a b l e b a s i s i n law o r i n f a c t . 
U n d e r Eames, I s s a c s o n and B u r g e r s , LTIC c o u l d n o t c o n c e i v a b l y h a v e 
b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e f i l i n g of i t s a p p e a l b e y o n d t h e 14 d a y t i m e 
p e r i o d p r e s c r i b e d b y Ru le 4(d) was a n y t h i n g b u t u n t i m e l y and t h a t , 
a s a r e s u l t , was an a p p e a l o v e r which t h e C o u r t would h a v e no 
a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n . D e s p i t e t h i s k n o w l e d g e , LTIC h a s 
c o n t i n u e d t o p u r s u e i t s u n t i m e l y a p p e a l , w i t h o u t a r e a s o n a b l e 
b a s i s f o r t h e same . C o n s e q u e n t l y , TFSL i s c l e a r l y e n t i t l e d t o 
d a m a g e s u n d e r R u l e 33(a) of t h e Utah Supreme C o u r t . 
IV. LTIC'S CLAIMS FOR COSTS AND REASONABLE ATTORNEYS'S FEES 
ARE UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IN THIS MATTER, FOR WHICH REASON THEY 
WERE PROPERLY DENIED BY THE LOWER COURT AND SHOULD BE DENIED ON 
APPEAL. 
LTIC b e g i n s i t s a r g u m e n t in s u p p o r t of a c l a im f o r 
a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s and c o s t s by s u g g e s t i n g t h e p a r t i e s a g a i n s t whom 
TFSL s h o u l d h a v e b r o u g h t l a w s u i t s . However , t h e i s s u e w i t h r e s p e c t 
t o LTIC ' s c l a im f o r a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s and c o s t s i s n o t w h e t h e r TFSL 
s u e d a l l p a r t i e s a g a i n s t whom i t may h a v e h a d c l a i m s , b u t w h e t h e r 
i t s c l a i m s a g a i n s t LTIC were c o g n i z a b l e a n d , i f n o t , w h e t h e r U t a h ' s 
t e s t f o r t h e i m p o s i t i o n of a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s and c o s t s u n d e r Utah 
Code Ann. § 7 8 - 2 7 - 5 6 was s a t i s f i e d . 
LTIC m i s c h a r a c t e r i z e s TFSL ' s T h i r d Amended C r o s s Claim a s 
a " c y n i c a l e f f o r t t o s k i r t t h e l o w e r C o u r t ' s December 28, 1987 
d i s m i s s a l " of i t s c l a i m s i n t h e Second Amended C r o s s Claim. To t h e 
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contrary, TFSL's ef for ts represent good fai th, zealous advocacy in 
pursuing proper claims by amendment and on t h i s appeal. TFSL has 
always believed t h a t t he lower Court rul ing with respect to i t s 
Second Amended Cross Claim was in e r ro r and has every r igh t to 
pursue t h i s issue t o a f inal resolut ion. See Eames v. Eames, 735 
P.2d 395 (Utah App. 1987). 
LTIC re fe r s t h e Court t o the case of Cady v. Johnson, 671 
P.2d 149 (Utah 1983) for the s ta tu tory t e s t for t he imposition of 
a t to rneys ' fees and cos ts in Utah. TFSL has no quar re l with the 
t e s t as se t forth in LTIC's Brief. However, TFSL disputes LTIC's 
conclusion t h a t i t s lawsuit i s frivolous, was brought t o obtain a 
nuisance sett lement, t h a t TFSL lacks an honest belief in the 
propr ie ty of i t s lawsuit and t h a t TFSL has any knowledge or belief 
t h a t i t s lawsuit h inders or defrauds LTIC. 
With respect t o the merits of TFSL's claim and i t s good 
faith ef for ts t o pursue i t s claims, LTIC cannot demonstrate 
sa t is fact ion of e i the r prong of the t e s t for a t to rneys ' fees and 
costs . LTIC has now abandoned any argument i t made with respect to 
the legal propr ie ty of TFSL's claims under Beck, which i s a t a c i t 
admission of t h e i r legal propr ie ty . Rather, LTIC has devoted i t s 
en t i re Appellate Brief t o arguing the fac ts . Also, LTIC can point 
to no fact which would support the conclusion t h a t TFSL lacks an 
honest belief in the propr ie ty of i t s act ions or has taken any 
action to hinder, defraud or take unfair advantage of LTIC. LTIC 
has failed to demonstrate t ha t i t i s en t i t led to a t to rneys ' fees 
- 27 -
and c o s t s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e l o w e r C o u r t p r o c e e d i n g and t h e l o w e r 
C o u r t p r o p e r l y d e n i e d LTIC ' s Mot ion , 
LTIC c i t e s t h e c a s e s of Eames v . Eames , 735 P.2d 395 (Utah 
App- 1987) and O 'Br i en v . Rush , 744 P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1987) t o 
s u p p o r t i t s c l a i m f o r c o s t s and a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s on a p p e a l u n d e r 
R u l e 33(a) of t h e R u l e s of t h e Utah S u p r e m e C o u r t . T h e s e c a s e s 
h e l d t h a t s u c h d a m a g e s may b e imposed o n l y when t h e a p p e a l i s 
f r i v o l o u s o r one h a v i n g no r e a s o n a b l e b a s i s i n law o r i n f a c t . F o r 
t h e r e a s o n s s t a t e d a b o v e , t h e r e i s no q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e r e a r e 
r e a s o n a b l e b a s e s i n law and i n f a c t f o r T F S I / s a p p e a l , and LTIC ' s 
c l a i m s u n d e r R u l e 33(a) of t h e Utah Supreme C o u r t mus t b e d e n i e d . 
CONCLUSION 
I n i t s T h i r d Amended C r o s s c l a i m , TFSL a s s e r t e d c a u s e s of 
a c t i o n f o r b r e a c h of c o n t r a c t , n e g l i g e n t m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and 
b r e a c h of t h e d u t y of good f a i t h and f a i r d e a l i n g . On A p p e a l , 
LTIC h a s a b a n d o n e d i t s c la im t h a t TFSL h a s f a i l e d t o s t a t e 
c o g n i z a b l e c a u s e s of a c t i o n a g a i n s t i t u n d e r t h e Beck d e c i s i o n of 
t h i s C o u r t . D i s c o v e r y a d d u c e d f a c t s t o s u p p o r t e a c h of t h e c l a i m s 
a s s e r t e d by TFSL a g a i n s t LTIC. As a r e s u l t of e r r o n e o u s 
c o n c l u s i o n s of law and f i n d i n g s of f a c t which w e r e i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y 
made a t t h e summary j u d g m e n t s t a g e , J u d g e Uno g r a n t e d summary 
jugdment in f a v o r of LTIC. Summary j u d g m e n t was i m p r o p e r and TFSL 
r e s p e c t f u l l y r e q u e s t s t h a t t h i s C o u r t r e v e r s e J u d g e Uno 's O r d e r 
and remand t h i s c a s e t o t h e l o w e r C o u r t f o r t r i a l of TFSL ' s c l a i m s 
a g a i n s t LTIC. 
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R u l e 4(d) of t h e R u l e s of t h e Utah Supreme C o u r t c l e a r l y 
r e q u i r e s a n y C r o s s A p p e a l t o b e b r o u g h t w i t h i n 14 d a y s of an 
A p p e a l from t h e l o w e r C o u r t ' s O r d e r . The r e c o r d d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t 
LTIC ' s C r o s s A p p e a l was b r o u g h t more t h a n 14 d a y s a f t e r TFSL/s 
A p p e a l . As a r e s u l t , t h i s C o u r t i s w i t h o u t A p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n 
t o c o n s i d e r t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d by LTIC i n i t s C r o s s A p p e a l and t h e 
C r o s s A p p e a l mus t b e d i s m i s s e d . S i n c e Utah law c l e a r l y p r o v i d e s 
t h a t t h e u n t i m e l y f i l i n g of an A p p e a l s t r i p s t h i s C o u r t of 
A p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e C r o s s A p p e a l , t h e C r o s s A p p e a l and 
p u r s u i t of t h e same by LTIC a r e c l e a r l y f r i v o l o u s , h a v i n g no 
r e a s o n a b l e b a s i s , f o r which r e a s o n TFSL i s e n t i t l e d t o damages 
u n d e r R u l e 33(a) of t h e R u l e s of t h e Utah S u p r e m e C o u r t . 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit AA - Excerpts - Deposition of Jeffrey K. Woodbury 
Exhibit BB- Excerpts - Deposition of August F. Brand 
Exhibit CC - Excerpts - Deposition of E. Earl Autenreith 
Exhibit DD - March 18, 1985 letter from Jeffrey K. Woodbury to 
Richmond Title Company 
Exhibit EE - Excerpts - Deposition of Timothy Alan Krueger 
23 
Q Do you recall approximately when you were provided 
with them? 
A It seems to me that I was provided a report that was 
dated before the transaction. It seems to me it was November 
or late November or early December, I can't remember the date 
of that report, but I was provided a report and it seems to me 
that I was supplied that by Diane Derr at the time I received 
the commitment letters, I did not obtain an update, although 
I asked for an update of that report, but I was verbally told 
that everybody remained in the same condition and relied upon 
that report in delivering my escrow instructions. 
Q Whom did you ask for a follow-up report? 
A Probably both from Diane Derr and I talked to the 
person at the title company. I heard a name mentioned last --
Gregory Seal's deposition the name of Tim Krueger. I honestly 
can't remember if I talked to a Tim Krueger or not. But I did 
talk to a male at the title company regarding the title 
report. 
Q Do you recall reviewing the policy of title 
insurance, the final policy? 
A I did. 
Q Do you recall approximately when that would have 
been? 
A It was sometime after the transaction. I don't 
remember exactly when, but it was after the transaction had 
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1 done, other than overseeing what they had — 
2 A The loan wasn't going to close until it was done, 
3 but I wasn't going to do anything to make sure — except the 
4 agreement was acceptable to both myself and to Tower and that 
5 agreement was sent to Tower1^ Earl Autenreith for his approval 
6 I as well as my own. We discussed it on the telephone. 
7 Q Now, this commitment letter came in December of 
8 19 84. The loan was not ultimately funded until March of the 
9 following year; isn't that true? 
10 A No. I don't think that's true. I do not think 
11 that's true. 
12 Q Tell me what your recollection is. 
13 A I don't think I received the commitment letter until 
14 I January. I could have received calls about it before that 
15 time, and when I say January, it would probably be the end of 
16 January, if I were to say when I received the commitment 
17 j letter, but I was contacted about it earlier. I see that the 
18 commitment letter wasn't ever accepted by Urry until January 
19 | 21, 1985. So my guess is I couldn't have received it before 
20 j that date. 
21 Q But in any event, the commitment letter predated by 
22 several months the actual funding of the loan; isn't that 
23 t r u e ? 
24 A T h a t ' s t r u e . 
25 Q And in preparing the loan documents for this loan. 
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youfve testified that you relied upon this November of 1984 
PR? 
A That's right, I did. 
Q When a loan is actually closed and funded months 
after the commitment letter and the accompanying PR you've 
told us you received from Richards-Woodbury, was it your 
practice to rely upon oral updates to the original PR that you 
received? 
A Is it my practice? Very — I don't think that it is 
improper to rely on oral updates. Is it my practice? Some 
title companies like to provide you updates. The problem with 
that is it costs more money, and I had asked — in this case, 
I had asked for a more updated opinion letter, but had 
received the assurance that I could rely on that older one and 
that the title remained the same. 
Q That assurance was received from whom? 
A From Tim Krueger, I guess. Now, wait a minute, I 
guess it was Tim Krueger. I received it from a man at the 
title company. I don't know, you know, if it was --
Q Did that give you any concern at all that you had 
demanded a written report -- do I understand that to be your 
general practice? You didn't get a written report? Did that 
give you any kind of concern at all? 
A It didn't really concern me and the reason why it 
didn't really concern me is because he was willing to allow me 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
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1 and he was willing to sign the escrow instructions in relying 
2 on that older report, and so it didn't — in hindsight now# I 
3 guess I should have been concerned, but at the time it didn't 
4 concern me. 
5 | Q Did you tell Mr. Autenreith that you were proceeding 
6 I on that basis? By that basis, I mean — 
7 A Mr. Autenreith had the same title report I had. 
8 Q Okay. But did you tell him that you were relying 
9 upon the oral assurances of the title company as to the 
10 current state of the title? 
11 A I --
12 MR. KIPP: Just a minute. I think that does not 
13 correctly state the record, and I object on that ground. He's 
14 I said there was an escrow instruction document signed that 
15 apparently updated the 'title report in writing, as I 
16 j understand his testirony. 
17 MR. DRAKE: If that's the case I need to go back, I 
18 didn't understand. 
19 j Q (BY MR. DRAKE) Would you explain the escrow 
20 I instruction to me? 
21 A Before what I did — before we fund a loan, we 
22 prepare instructions that are signed and accepted by the title 
23 company wherein the title company recognizes that the title 
24 policy that we are relying upon is a correct — is, in fact, 
25 correct and that all the liens and all other items that we 
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specifically state in that are either subordinate to our loan 
or removed from the title. And so I did obtain a written 
signed agreed escrow instruction from the title company with 
respect to this older title report. 
Q And when was that obtained and what was its date? 
A Prior to the funding, I'm not exactly sure what that 
date was. 
Q Would it have been fairly contemporaneous with the 
March 13 closing of the loan? 
A Yes. 
Q Within a week or so or days? 
A Did the loan close on March 13? I don't know when 
the loan closed to my personal recollection. Whenever the 
loan closed, it would have been contemporaneous with that. 
Q The trust deed which secures the loan is dated March 
13. 
A It would have been very fairly contemporaneous with 
that. 
Q Do you have copy of those escrow instructions? 
A I have a copy in my draft of them in my files. The 
signed copies were sent to Tower Federal Savings and Loan. 
Q To your knowledge, was Tower Federal, through Mr. 
Autenreith, apprised that you were in part relying upon the 
written escrow instructions from the title company? 
A Was he apprised? It was standard — it's normally 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
1 
2 
3 
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10 
11 
12 
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-- well, I mean, he received the escrow instructions, he had 
received the copy of the title report. Anything that I had 
was sent to him. 
Q Did he have a copy of those escrow instructions 
before this loan closed? 
A Well, it comes to the definition of closing. The 
escrow instructions would have been prepared around the 13th. 
He would have received a copy prior to funding. He would have 
been able to review those and accept those prior to funding of 
the loan. I don't know how you define closing a loan. Is it 
funding or is it the date everybody signed the documents? 
That's the question — 
Q I don't want to dance with you, you tell me whatever 
is comfortable with you and we'll work from there. 
A He received it prior to funding. 
16 | Q In going about your business of complying with the 
i 
17 j commitment letter, drafting the loan documents, putting this 
whole thing together as counsel for Richards-Woodbury, did you 
rely upon those written escrow instructions as evidence of the 
state of the title at the time the loan was closed, funded, 
whatever you're comfortable with? 
A Did I rely? I relied upon the title policy in 
preparing the escrow instructions and relied upon those escrow 
instructions being carried out in funding that loan, yes* 
That's what I relied on. Whether that's what your question 
18 
19 
20 ' 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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1 exactly was, I don't know. But that's what I relied on. 
2 Q I need to ask the indulgence of counsel to take a 
3 minute to look at those escrow instructions, so if we can take 
4 a five minute break. 
5 (Off-the-record discussion) 
6 (Whereupon, Exhibit No. E 
was marked 
7 for identification.) 
8 Q (BY MR. DRAKE) Mr. Woodbury, you've been shown a 
9 copy of Exhibit E to your deposition, which is a March 18, 
10 1985 document which I believe is the escrow instructions to 
11 which we were just referring; is that correct? 
12 A It is, except for the underlining and other matters 
13 on it. 
14 Q I understand. With those exceptions, it appears to 
15 be the document? 
16 A It appears to be such document, yes. 
17 Q It bears the date of March 18, 1985. When was the 
18 document drafted? 
19 A Probably forms of it were drafted between the 13th 
20 and the 18th. 
21 Q Did you ever talk to Greg Seal about this document? 
22 A I don't remember. 
23 Q Did you ever make him aware of it in any manner? 
24 A I honestly — my guess is that I did, but I don't 
25 honestly remember. 
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A When I say "this thick," I mean two feet. 
Q I didn't bring an extra copy, but I'm going to refer 
and quote from the third party complaint that your office 
filed in this action. 
A That's fine. 
Q And in paragraph 14 it states that Tower would not 
have closed the loan transaction or advanced the sum of 
$750,000 unless it had been assured that its trust deed would 
be a second valid and subsisting second lien against the 
property. 
Do you have that? 
A Okay. 
Q My question is what in your mind does the language 
second valid and subsisting second lien mean? 
A What that means is that — well, I guess probably 
the example in a first lien situation is that if you were to 
go and close on a piece of property and discover that there 
were five unpaid liens on that property, it would make an 
attorney leery whether they would want to close and buy that 
property, because they'd think that there are probably other 
unpaid liens out that could jump up because they haven't been 
paying their debts as they go along and haven't been managing 
the transaction properly. 
And in this situation, we got -- we received no 
indication that business was not operating in an harmonious 
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1 and fluent manner. So when I say valid and subsisting lien, I 
2 probably mean that as far as a second lien is concerned, that 
3 we needed to — if we would have known that bills were not-
4 being paid and those liens were being piled up on the 
5 property, the transaction would not have closed* I would have 
6 advised Tower that it's crazy to close this, because these 
7 people don't have the money right now to handle ongoing 
8 problems that are probably greater than the amount of the 
9 debt. And they would have had to understand that. 
10 Q Was the language that I just read you yours, so far 
11 as you know? 
12 A No, probably not. It's probably Verden Bettilyon's. 
13 Q Does the word subsisting have a common meaning or 
14 definition in the trade or the industry? 
15 A Not necessarily that I know of. 
16 Q I just want to know if it means anything to you? 
17 A No, I didnft write it. 
18 Q Okay, fine. Have you ever discussed this 
19 transaction since the filing of the complaint with August 
2 0 Brand? 
21 A Discussed the transaction? I've discussed the 
22 lawsuit with him. I've never discussed any — well, that's 
23 not — that's an overgeneralization. I've discussed this 
24 lawsuit with him against me. I have not discussed the details 
25 of the transaction, no, to my knowledge. I may have made some 
EXHIBIT "BB" 
commenced on the project before the deed of trust was recorded? 
A The first deed of trust you are referring to? 
Q Any deed of trust. The second deed of trust in this 
case. 
A No, I am not familiar/ that much familiar with the 
lien law. 
Q You didn't know that? 
A No. 
Q Who did you rely upon in terms of legal advice with 
respect to mechanic's lien law in March of '85? 
A We rely on the title company and our attorneys. 
Q And your attorney in this case was Jeff Woodbury? 
A It was the law firm of Woodbury, Bettilyon and 
Kesler. In this particular case Jeff Woodbury was handling it. 
Q How many prior loans had you closed with the 
assistance of Jeff Woodbury in March of 1985? 
A I can't recall that. 
Q Any kind of an estimate? 
A Perhaps five or ten. 
Q Would those loans have been similar to the type of 
Tower loan we've been talking about? 
A Yes. 
MR. HUMPHERYS: I need a point of clarification. Do 
you mean a gap loan? 
THE WITNESS: Or similar by — 
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1 MR. HUMPHERYS: He's already testified he's only done 
2 one gap loan, 
3 THE WITNESS: Income property loanf is that what you 
4 are referring to? 
5 MR. DRAKE: That's fine. 
6 MR. HUMPHERYS: It becomes important/ because if that 
7 is narrowly interpreted/ then of course — 
8 MR. DRAKE: If it's important to you make your 
9 clarification. I appreciate that. 
10 MR. HUMPHERYS: He was referring to income producing 
11 property loans. 
12 Q (BY MR. DRAKE) Would the filing or the arising of 
13 mechanic's liens on a piece of property between the time of a 
14 loan application and a loan closing be one of the problems/ to 
15 use your language/ which might arise in the course of a loan 
16 transaction? 
17 A Would they be a problem? 
18 Q Yesf sir. 
19 A Of course they would be a problem. Unless they 
20 cleared up before the loan closing. 
21 Q Did Richards-Koodbury take any steps to clear up 
22 mechanic's liens, to use your phrase/ with respect to this 
23 Tower loan? 
24 A I don't recall whether there were any liens, whether 
25 any liens appeared at the preliminary title report/ or whether 
there were any existing liens before the loan closing. 
Q If the preliminary report had showed no mechanic's 
liens, and the loan closed some three months later, would 
Richards-Woodbury have taken any steps to determine whether or 
not mechanic's liens had arisen in that three-month period of 
time? 
A No other steps except to work with the title company. 
Q You mentioned that Mr. Authenreith and Mr. Spagnola 
came out and actually went to the Buildmart Mall property at 
some point in time. And I believe you accompanied them; is 
that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Were you ever a party to a discussion with either of 
those gentlemen about mechanic's liens on the Buildmart Mall 
property? 
A No. 
Q The subject never arose? 
A Never arose. 
Q To your knowledge were either of those gentlemen 
concerned about mechanic's liens on the property? 
A You are always concerned about mechanic's liens, 
obviously. But we would have never closed the loan if we had 
any knowledge that any lawsuits or mechanic lien problems would 
appear after the loan is closed. 
Q And what specifically did you do to protect against 
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E X H I B I T "CC" 
30 
1 company is insuring over the mechanic's lien, with that, 
2 with those kind of assurances, anything else we can get, we 
3 would probably have made the loan. 
4 0 That is your answer to the general part of the 
5 question. 
6 Do you recall what you did, specifically, on the 
7 Buildmart loan to satisfy your concerns? 
8 A On Buildmart, I know we had two things, because 
9 they were into commitment. One was assurance by Mr. Seal 
10 that there were no mechanic's liens, in his opinion, which 
11 reassured us, plus the commitment from Lawyers Title that 
12 they were insuring over any mechanic's lien, and we had no 
13 evidence there were any, looking at both reports, from 
14 Mr. Seal and from Lawyers Title. There was no evidence that 
15 we had any problems. If we had known there was any mechanic's 
16 liens, the potential mechanic's lien, we wouldn't have made 
17 the loan. 
18 Q Were you given any specific directions on the 
19 Buildmart loan by Spagnola or the Board to do anything with 
20 respect to mechanic's liens or with the thingsthat you told 
21 me about? And then we'll get into detail as what you did as a 
22 good lawyer doing your job. 
23 A Well, I hope I'm doing my job. When I am so doing 
24 those things, as I said, it was a unique loan. And the 
25 concern is informing the Board members of mechanic's liens. 
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1 A Why were they chosen? 
2 0 Yes. 
3 A I don't know. 
4 0 You don't know? 
5 A No. 
6 Q Have you had any prior involvement,sir,with Title 
7 Lawyers? Lawyers Title? 
8 A In Utah? 
9 0 Yes. 
10 A Probably in other transactions, I just can't 
11 recall. There were several different title companies that 
12 were involved. But, I would say Lawyers,probably was. I 
13 don't recall specifically. 
14 0 Had you had any other prior involvement with 
15 Richmond Title or Mr. Tim Krueger? 
16 A I don't know Mr. Tim Krueger. 
17 Q K-r~u-e-g-e-r? 
18 A I don't know him. 
19 0 Do you have any problems or reservations about 
20 using Richmond Title or Lawyers Title in this case? 
21 A Certainly not Lawyers Title. 
22 0 Do you have confidence in Lawyers with your past 
23 dealing with them? 
24 A I have dealt with them many times. 
1 deposition, which is, we have been told by Mr. Woodbury, the 
2 escrow instruction. Take a minute and flip through there. 
3 To save time, Mr. Autenreith, I can see you are to 
4 the point that I am concerned about the document. I am not 
5 going to ask anything in detail other than the provision 
6 that is on the second page with respect to instructing the 
7 title companyMto take all other acts necessdry to insure 
8 that the Trust Deed enclosed herewith as described in 
9 in Paragraph 1 is in a second lien position behind the 
10 exception set forth as Paragraph 17? M 
11 0 Do you see that language? 
12 A Yes. 
13 0 Do you have anything to do wth the drafting or 
14 including of that provision in the escrow instructions? 
15 A No. 
16 Q Mr. Woodbury or the author of the instructions 
17 would have included that? 
18 A Yes. 
19 0 Were you aware that that instruction had been 
20 included in the escrow instruction to the title company? 
21 A I believe so, because this is fairly common, as I 
22 recall. 
23 0 That is common? 
24 A It's common procedure. Of course, those are 
25 escrow instructions as used in Utah and not used in 
54 
2 II Pennsylvania, but that would be fairly common, I would 
2ii t h i n k , 
^ II Q Your answer w a s , you believed you were aware of 
. the inclusion of that paragraph in the letter? 
5 n A Yes 
g II 0 What was your understanding of the meaning of that 
., paragraph, and what if anything the title company was to do 
R II as a result? 
q II A Well, if we weren't in the second lien position, 
.
 n i, where the documents were not to be recorded. 
2«i || 0 And by your statement, if we were not in a second 
22 lien position, what in your mind, at the same time this 
2 3 transaction closed, would have resulted in the Tower deed of 
24 n trust not being in a second position? 
25 A The only thing would have been mortgage or deed of 
16 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
24 
25 
trust to First Security Dank. 
27 0 You knew that was of record, obviously. Then the 
only significance you had to be behind that and behind that 
only. 
And by "behind that," do you mean that there were 
no intervening liens of record? 
A Yes. Absolutely, or any liens of any nature. 
23 Absolutely nothing of record. Nothing of record. 
0 Nothing of record? 
A No knowledge of anything else. 
1 0 Tell me the things that you have done to determine 
2 whether or not there were other liens of record that might 
3 have been 
4 A Two things to rely on. 
5 Q All right, 
6 A One was the preliminary title commitment from 
7 lawyers which showed nothing, and we had an opinion letter 
3 from Jeffrey Seal. 
g 0 Greg Seal? 
XO A Greg Seal. Gregory Seal. 
11 0 All right. 
12 A And we had, as I recall, we had a fairly detailed 
13 response. He had about two minor matters which we say 
14 didn't relate to it, which were insured over any way on the 
15 prior loan with First Security Bank. Other than that, with 
16 those assurances, we were satisfied. I was. 
17 0 Go ahead. 
18 A The only risk I am concerned about is First 
19 Security Bank. And that is because that is the risk that 
20 the Tower Board accepted when they made the second loan. 
21 0 The preliminary title report that I have asked you 
22 about was issued in November of 1984? 
23 A Yes. 
24 0 Near t h e t i m e t h e commitment f o r t h e l o a n was made by 
25 Richards-Woodbury, l o a n d i d n ' t c l o s e t i l l March 20 th of 1 9 8 5 . I n 
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1 that intervening period of three or four months, did Tower 
2 or did you do anything to update the preliminary title 
3 report or to do additional search of the record to 
4 determine — 
5 A That is what this does. Excuse me. 
6 0 By this, would your answer be where you are pointing? 
7 A Escrow instruction says to the title company," you 
8 update and then update your search; and if there are any 
g changes, don't record it." That is what it says to me. 
10 I Q Did you have any discussion or communication with 
H the title company to make sure that the title company could 
12 understand that is what that language meant? 
13 A This would have been done by Jeff Woodbury. 
14 I 0 To your knowledge, did Mr. Woodbury have such a 
15 communication with Richmond? 
15 A I don't know. 
17 Q For the sake of discussion, let's say, between the 
13 time of the pre-title report of November of 1984, and the 
19 I closing of March 20th of '85, that there had been an 
20 intervening mechanic's lien filed by someone who had done 
2i work on the mall, subcontractor? 
22 ft Yes. 
23 0 Someone filed a notice of lien for painting or 
24 some other work that had been done. How would that have 
25 ]| been handled in the transaction if it had been known to 
1 Tower? 
2 A I think it would have been a problem, because at 
3 that point you are beginning — it's a red flag -- I 
4 think it would have been a red flag to me and red flag to 
5 Spagnola or whoever at Tower; that maybe there are problems 
6 that we are unaware of. 
7 1 Q Had you discussions with Mr. Spagnola or anyone at 
8 Tower about that very issue of whether or not a lien had 
9 been discovered, would have been a red flag, whether it 
10 would have affected the loan transaction? 
11 A Knowing him well enough and knowing myself and the 
12 nature of the transaction, I don't think that discussion 
13 would even have to be made. He knows, and I know, that any 
14 time you have got a potential mechanic's lien floating out 
15 there, you have a potential problem. 
16 Q Well --
17 A In other words, the transaction might have gone 
18 ahead, but at that point it's a red flag. You do a little 
19 more investigation into finding out what is going on here. 
20 0 Would the effect of discovery of the lien like 
21 that and the manner in which it was dealt have been 
22 determined by the size of the lien, type of the lien, or 
23 anything about the lien itself? 
24 Let me just give you an illustration. Let's use 
25 as an example, the painter had filed a lien for 1,000 bucks 
58 
1 in January of 1985, between the time of the present title 
2 and the closing of the loan report, 
3 What would you have done about that as opposed to 
4 a larger lien, say of $100,000? Would the amount have given 
5 you any concern or been relevant at all to your 
6 consideration? 
7 A I wouldn't make that judgment. All I need to 
8 know is there is a lien filed. 
9 Q What would you have done? 
10 A That judgment would then have to be made by 
11 management. It becomes an underwriting question. Not 
12 necessarily a legal question at that point. 
13 Q So, do I understand you to say, if you had known 
14 J about such a lien, that your response would be merely to 
15 inform underwriting or the Board, the appropriate person, 
16 and the determination of how to deal with that would have 
17 been left to them? 
18 A At that point, it would have been up to them. 
19 o Had you ever faced a similar kind of situation in 
20 any other Tower loans? 
21
 MR. KINCAID: What other situation? Clarify it. 
22 0 Let's say where you discovered an intervening lien 
23 of record between the time of commitment or pre-title 
24 II report, and the closing of the loan. 
A I can't remember everything. 
1 You say it would have raised a red flag. Would 
2 the fact that there were potential liens that weren't of 
3 record but potentially would have caused Tcwer not to do the 
4 deal? 
5 A I think so. My understanding of the reason that 
6 Tower went into the loan was it was a project that was 
7 complete, everything was paid for except for this other 
8 supplemental satellite building which was necessary in order 
9 to complete the project as a viable project. 
10 The fact there is something unpaid for for work 
11 already done, it would have caused a real problem with that. 
12 0 1 think you testified a little while ago that none 
13 of the Tower loan proceeds were to be used to pay off any 
14 existing debts that were owed to any materialmen or other 
15 individuals. Is that right? 
16 A That's right. 
17 0 1 represented to you that Jeff Woodbury said in 
18 his deposition that some of the proceeds were in fact to pay 
19 off some of these outstanding debts. Is that correct? 
20 A That is incorrect, as far as I am concerned. 
21 0 In Paragraph 16 of Tower's third amended cross-
22 claim, the statement is made that the misrepresentation by 
23 Lawyers Title in the commitment and policy were material to 
24 you; whereas, decisions to lend money on the Buildmart 
25 Project, I think you indicated earlier in your testimony 
144 
1 claimed loss in this litigation was caused by something 
2 other than the First Security Dank foreclosure on the 
3 project? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q What do you think it was caused by? 
6 A By the existence, you know — I don't think we 
7 would have made the loan had there been evidence of a 
g problem with the initial construction. I don't think Tower 
9 would have been involved in the loan. 
10 0 But, when Tower made the loan, Tower assumed the 
H risk of the senior lienor foreclosing on the property. 
12 Right? 
13 A But, if it's a viable project, that probably 
14 doesn't occur. 
15 0 At the time that Tower made the decision to get 
16 involved, Tower reviewed an appraisal on the property. 
17 Right? 
18 A Yes* 
19 Q Tower would assume the risk that the appraisal 
20 value of the property could be down in succeeding years? 
21 II A Right. That is an underwriting decision I 
wouldn't make, but that is true. 
23 11 Q So, if the senior lienor — I'm now talking in 
24 || the general sense -- if the senior lienor foreclosed on a 
property, and the appraised value would have qone cown so 
EXHIBIT "DD 
/OODBURY, BETT1LYON AND KE5LL 
ATTORNEYS AT UkW 
» l l > C t * WOCCOURY 
niCHAPO'j .vOCCOURY 
FFREY K. wOOOBURY 
X«0 E>ST 200 SOUTH 
SALT U K £ CITY. UTAH a-*! u 
TEL£PHONe (601) :C4-40X4 
March 1 8 , 1985 
Richmond T i t l e Company 
3 24 Sou th S t a t u 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT b ' U l l 
RE: ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS RELATING TO CLOSING 
OF LOAN ANb THE ISSUANCE OF TITLE 
INSURANCE FOR A LOAM BETWEEN RICHARDS-
WOGDDURY MORTGAGE CORP., {M LENDER") TO 
BUILDMART MALL, A UTAH LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
("BORROWER") . lUCHARDS-WOODBURY MORTGAGE 
CORP. THEREAFTER ASSIGNED THEIR INTEREST 
AS LENDER TO TOWER FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION. 
G e n t l e m e n : 
Enclosed you will find the following checks and documents: 
1. A Trust Deed in the face amount of $750,000.00 executed by 
Uotiowo: in favor of Lender. 
2. A Security Agreement by and between Borrower and Lender. 
J. Two UCC-1 Financing Statements executed by both Borrower and 
Lender. 
4. An Assignment of Rents and Leases executed by Borrower arid 
two additional UCC-1 Financial Statements executed therewith, 
5. A Subordination Agreement executed by S.B.K. Partnership, N. 
Shirl Weight and Foothill Thrift and Loan. 
6. A check or checks in the amount uE $1,191,00 made payable to 
Security Title Company for title insurance policy plus an 
additional 3 3 S. 00 for endorsements as provided herein and 
$100.00 estimated recording co-ota, Co»: a total of $1,326.00. 
7. An Alignment of Trust Deed and such other assignments of 
loan documents executed therewith. %" 
You ace hereby instructed to issue an ALTA Lender's title 
policy in favor of Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corporation, a Utah 
corporation, as the Lender. Said policy should also contain the 
appropriate endorsement providing that Tower Federal Savings anc 
Loan Association is named and also insured as a Lender under this 
policy. 
The title policy should be in the. loan amount of 5*750,000.00 
and should cover the real property described in the Trust Deed 
enclosed herewith and identified in paragraph number i above, ana 
also correspond to the legal description in your Commitment 
Letter No. 1191-S dated November 23, 1004 prepared tor 
liichards-VCoodbucy Mortgage Corp. Please immediately check the 
legal descr tpt ion in all the documents to make sure they are con-
sistent with your title policy. ll there is any discrepancy, 
please contact Jefrrey K. Woodbury at (oOl) i G 4 -4 3 2 4 immediately 
before proceeding any further with these instructions. 
Dep»>..iti the etiock or checks de\;erLbed in paragraph numbered 
b above i:i yuur escrow account. 
You 'are instructed to take all other acts necessary to 
insure that the Trust Deed enclosed herewith as describee in 
paragraph number 1 is in a second lien position behind the excep-
tion set forth as paragraph 17. The only prior exceptions to 
said Trust Deed should be those listed in your Commitment foe 
Title Insurance, Schedule B, Section 2, numbered exception 
paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20. 
The said title policy should also contain endorsements 100,29 and 
103.1 and should insure against any mechanic's or materialmen's 
liens. 
You should verify that all 1984 taxes have been paid in full 
so that Exception No. 6 may be removed from the policy as an 
exception. 
You should note that Exception No. 10 shall remain en said 
title policy, however, said lien shall be subordinated by the 
document described in paragraph 5, to the debt evidenced by the 
loan documents described in paragraph.*; 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
You are instructed to take all other acts required to con-
form tne status oC the title of the subject real property to the 
information "that shall be shown j!> re«v>l,i,J,---(J 0l* the above 
referenced title policy inclu'Jinj bur: ao«. limited to the 
following: 
a. Record the document described in paragraph 1 above with the 
appropriate*county oCLice where the property is locatea. 
b. Record one UCC-1 Financing Statement described in paragraph 
3 and the Security Agreement set forth in paragraph 2 in the 
appropriate county office where the property is located. 
-2-
c. Return to Lender the stamped remaining copies of the UCC-1 
Form evidencing that it has been filea along with a state-
ment from you setting forth that there are no other prior 
security interests appearing of record against the cate-
gories oC personal property on the premises as are set Cortn 
in said Form UCC-1 whicn you have filed, 
d. Record one UCC-1 Financing Statement and the Assignment of 
Rents and Leases described in paragraph 4 in the appropriate 
county office where the pioperty is located. Vile the 
remaining UCC-1 Financing Statement with the appropriate 
oCficialu at the Lieutenant Governor's Office of the State 
of Utah. Return to Lender the stamped remaining copies or. 
the UCC-1 Form evidencing i-hal it lias bc^n filen alon«j with 
a j».n«:iu^nL from you setting forth that there are no otnec 
prior secuiily interests appeariny ol record against tne 
categories of pergonal propeLty on the premises as are set 
foctn in said Totm UCC-l whicn you havj filed. 
e. Uecoid the document described in paragraph 5 above in the 
appropriate county office whi-ce the property is located. 
NOTICE: THERE IS RECORDING INFORMATION THAT MUST BE 
INSERTED IN THE APPROPRIATE BLANKS EY YOUR OFFICE PuIOR TO 
RECORDING THIS DOCUMENT. BEFORE RECORDING, MAKE SURE THAT 
IT liAS- BEEN EXECUTED BY ALL THE PARTIES. 
f. Recocd the document described in paragraph 7 above in the 
appropriate county office where the property is located. 
You are hereby instructed to have all oC the documents 
described above returned to Lender atter they have been Cully 
executed. Note, hewever, that you should only record the docu-
ments tjut I have specifically requested to be recorded. 
It you are unable or unwilling to promptly follow all of the 
above referenced instructions, you are directed to contact imme-
diately Diane Derr of. Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Xorp. of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, for further instructions, at telephone numoer 
(801) 272-8001. When you have complied with all instructions 
herein and issued the above requested title policy, you may apply, 
the moniv?3 described in paragraph 5 to your r.ccouut. 
Very truly yours, 
WOODBURY, BETT1LY0N AND KESLER 
irJflciy h'. Woodbury 
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ACCEPTANCK__UF ESCROW INSTRUCT IONS 
Foe Ten Dollars (510.00) and other good a:id valuable 
consideration, the receipt and suf L: iciency of which is hereby 
acknowledged, RICHMOND TITLL COMPANY, hereby accepts the terms 
and conditions ot the above escrow instructions and acknowledges 
that Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corp, is fully relying upon said 
acceptance and the prompt carrying out of the above instructions. 
Dated the day o£ March, 19U5. 
RICHMOND TITLE COMPANY 
By: 
Its: 
-4-
EXHIBIT "EE" 
1 THE SECOND PAGE REFERENCES A HARPER EXCAVATING LIEN. 
2 A OH, ALL RIGHT, UP HERE, OKAY. 
3 Q ANY WAY FOR YOU TO TELL WHETHER THE HARPER 
4 EXCAVATING LIEN SHOWN ON D-10 IS THE ONE REFLECTED? 
5 A THE BOOK AND PAGE REFLECTS THE SAKE BOOK AND PAGE. 
6 (DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 12 IS MARKED FOR 
7 IDENTIFICATION.) 
8 Q (BY MR. DRAKE) LET ME SHOW YOU D-12, MR. KRUEGER, 
9 WHICH I WILL REPRESENT TO YOU ARE THE ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS IN 
10 THIS TRANSACTION THAT WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY MR. JEFF KOCD3URY 
11 WERE PREPARED BY HIM AND SENT TO YOU AS PART OF THIS 
12 TRANSACTION. DO YOU RECOGNIZE EXHIBIT D-12? 
13 A I DON'T RECALL IT. HOWEVER, THIS LAST PAGE HAS MY 
14 SIGNATURE ON IT. THEREFORE, YOU KNOW, I MUST HAVE SEEN IT. 
15 Q THE BACK PAGE OF EXHIBIT D-12 INDICATES YOUR 
16 SIGNATURE, MARCH 18TH OF '85, AS ACCEPTING THE ESCROW 
17 INSTRUCTIONS; DOES IT NOT? 
18 A YES. 
19 Q DO YOU REMEMBER TALKING TO JEFF WOOD5URY A3CUT THE 
20 | ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO ACCEPTING THEM? 
21 | A I DON'T RECALL. 
22 | Q DO YOU REMEMBER WHETHER YOU GOT A COPY FROM HIM IN 
23 | HIS OFFICE OR THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF YOUR RECEIPT OF THESE 
24 | INSTRUCTIONS? 
25 I REALLY DON'T RECALL. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN PART OF 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE DOCUMENTS I PICKED UP AT THAT TIME, WHEN 1 WAS IN HIS . 
OFFICE, IN THAT OFFICE. 
Q DO YOU RECALL TAKING ANY SPECIFIC ACTION AFTER 
RECEIVING THE ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS AND PURSUANT TO THE ESCROW 
INSTRUCTIONS? 
IN HERE. 
PROBABLY COMPLETING WHAT THEY INSTRUCTED ME TO DO 
LET ME HAVE YOU FLIP OVER TO PAGE 2 OF THE 
INSTRUCTIONS AND HAVE YOU SCAN DOWN TO THE FOURTH PARAGRAPH 
THERE, THE PARAGRAPH THAT STARTS OUT, YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO 
TAKE ALL OTHER ACTS NECESSARY TO ENSURE. WOULD YOU TAKE A 
MINUTE AND READ THAT PARAGRAPH. 
A WHAT IS PARAGRAPH 17? 
Q WELL, WE HAVE GOT TO GO EACK. THAT'S THE NOVEMBER 
COMMITMENT. 
MR. ORITT: THAT'S THE FIRST SECURITY BANK. 
THE WITNESS: IF I CAN FIND THE COMMITMENT, THAT 
WILL JUST SIMPLIFY LIFE A WHOLE LOT. 
MR. DRAKE: YES. 
THE WITNESS: CFAY. 
Q (BY MR. DRAKE) READY? 
A YES. 
Q WITH REFERENCE TO THE FOURTH PARAGRAPH ON PAGE 2 
OF EXHIBIT D-12, WHAT DID YOU UNDERSTAND TO BE REQUIRED OF 
YOU BY THAT PARAGRAPH, MR. KRUEGER? 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
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A THAT THE ONLY POLICY WHEN ISSUED SHOULD ONLY BE 
SUBJECT TO THE EXCEPTIONS SET FORTH IN THAT PARAGRAPH. 
Q AND BY THAT PARAGRAPH, THAT'S PARAGRAPH 17 IN THE 
NOVEMBER * 84 COMMITMENT THAT WE HAVE TALKED A30UT? 
A MORE THAN JUST PARAGRAPH 17. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, AND 20. 
Q AND THOSE ARE ENUMERATED IN THE NOVEMBER '84 
COMMITMENT? 
A YES. 
Q WHAT DID YOU DO IN CARRYING OUT THE ESCROW 
INSTRUCTIONS TO ENSURE THAT YOUR ACTIONS CONFORMED TO 
PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS? 
A I PROBABLY COMPLIED WITH IT. I DON'T RECALL. 
Q DO YOU RECALL TAKING ANY SPECIFIC ACTION TO MAKE 
SURE YOU DID COMPLY? 
A I'M SORRY, I DON'T RECALL. 
Q WE HAVE TALKED ABOUT THIS A LITTLE BIT IN A 
GENERAL SENSE. DO YOU RECALL BEING AWARE OF OR, IN FACT, 
EVEN INVOLVED IN A PROCEDURE OF GETTING SOME OF THE MECHANICS 
LIENS THAT WERE OF RECORD RELEASED PRIOR TO RECORDING THE 
TOWER LOAN DOCUMENTS? 
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Q 
MECHANICS 
MARCH 20TH 
A 
EARLIER. 
0 
1
 ISSUED? 
WHAT DID YOU DO TO CHECK AND SEE IF THERE WERE ANY 
LIENS OF RECORD THAT HAD BEEN RECORDED PRIOR TO 
OF '85 WHEN THE DOCUMENTS WERE RECORDED? 
IT WOULD HAVE BEEN UPDATED AS WE DISCUSSED 
THE TITLE INSURANCE POLICY THAT WAS ACTUALLY 
(AN-OFF-THE-RECORD DISCUSSION WAS HELD.) 
MR. DRAKE: WELL, LET'S GO HACK ON «H1LE WE ARE 
WAITING FOR THAT TO BE DONE. 
(BY MR. DRAKE) MR. KRUEGER, THE LANGUAGE IN 
PARAGRAPH 4 OF EXHIBIT D-12 SAYS YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO TAKE 
ALL OTHER ACTS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE TRUST DEED 
ENCLOSED HEREWITH, AND THAT'S THE TOWER DEED OF TRUST, IS IN 
A SECOND LIEN POSITION BEHIND THE EXCEPTIONS SET FORTH AS 
PARAGRAPH 17, AND PARAGRAPH 17 AS YOU HAVE REVIEWED REFERS TO 
THE FIRST SECURITY FIRST. WHAT DOES IN SECOND LIEN POSITION 
MEAN TO YOU? 
A SECONDARY POSITION TO THE FRIWARY TRUST DEED. 
THERE ISN'T ANYTHING THAT PRECEDES IT OTHER THAN 17, OTHER 
THAN THOSE EXCEPTIONS THAT HE'S EXCEPTED DOWN BELOW. 
Q WOULD MECHANICS LIENS THAT WERE OF RECORD BETWEEN 
THE FIRST SECURITY AND THE RECORDING OF THE TOWER'DEED OF 
TRUST HAVE 3EEN OF IMPORTANCE TO YOU IN COMPLYING WITH 
PARAGRAPH 4? 
A YES. 
Q YOU HAVE SAID THAT YOU DID YOUR UPDATE. DO YOU 
RECALL IN DOING THE UPDATE DISCOVERING THE JERRY MELLEN LIEN, 
FOR INSTANCE? 
A I DON'T RECALL. IF YOU COULD PRODUCE THE CHANGE 
SHEET, OF 1191, THAT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL. 
Q I WISH I COULD. THERE WERE CERTAIN LIENS AS YOU 
HAVE SEEN, THE STAKER LIEN, AND THE NATIONAL PLUMBING AND 
HEATING LIEN THAT WERE OF RECORD AND THEN SUBSEQUENTLY 
RELEASED BEFORE THE TOWER LOAN CLOSED. THERE WERE OTHER 
LIENS THAT WERE OF RECORD AND WERE NOT RELEASED OR IN ANY 
MANNER TAKEN CARE OF BEFORE THE LOAN CLOSED. CAN YOU EXPLAIN 
WHY THAT OCCURRED? 
A I DON'T KNOW. WHICH LIENS ARE YOU REFERRING TO? 
PERHAPS YOU CAN HELP ME HERE. 
Q THE JERRY MELLEN LIEN, THE ONE WE TALKED A30UT 
RIGHT AT THE OUTSET? 
A THIS ONE, OKAY. WHAT OTHERS? 
Q THE HARPER EXCAVATING LIEN THAT WAS FILED A DAY 
AFTER THE CLOSING ON THE 14TH. THERE WAS A COMPLEX 
FABRICATORS LIEN, BUT THOSE ARE NOT OF CONCERN TO ME. THEY 
MAY BE OF CONCERN TO OTHERS. BUT SPECIFICALLY WITH REFERENCE 
TO THE JERRY MELLEN LIEN AND THE HARPER EXCAVATING LIEN, CAN 
YOU EXPLAIN WHY THOSE WERE OF RECORD BEFORE THE TOWER DEED OF 
TRUST WAS RECORDED, AND YET NOT RELEASED OR TAKEN CARE OF IN 
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SOME MANNER BEFORE THE DEED OF TRUST WAS RECORDED? 
A NO, I DON'T KNOW. I DON'T RECALL. 
Q WOULD YOU HAVE CONSIDERED THE RELEASING OF THOSE 
LIENS OR THE TAKING CARE OF THOSE LIENS IN SOME MANNER TO 
HAVE BEEN REQUIRED BY PARAGRAPH 4 IN iHE ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS 
AND REQUIRED OF YOU? 
A YES. 
n THE JERRY MELLEN LIEN IS REFLECTED IN ONE OF THE 
CHANGE SHEETS THAT WE HAVE TALKED ABOUT EARLIER. CAN i < »U 
EXPLAIN WHY IT IS THAT, HAVING DISCOVERED THE EXISTENCE OF 
THE MELLEN LIEN, AT LEAST AS OF JANUARY 22ND, ' 8 r>, V-lu' Jl WAS 
NOT RELEASED OR IN SCME MANNER TAKEN CARE OF BEFORE THE TOWER 
LOAN DOCUMENTS WERE RECORDED? 
A I DON'T KNCW. I DO KNOW THAT ON THE CHANGE SHEET, 
I HAVE GOT WRITTEN OFF TO THE SIDE, TENANT'S OBLIGATION. IT 
MAY BE THAT AT ESTIMATE, I WAS PROVIDED SOME INFORMATION OR 
PROOF THAT, IN FACT, THAT LIEN OF MELLEN PERTAINED TO ONE OF 
THE STALLS, IF YOU WILL, THAT WAS RENTED OUT THERE TO VARIOUS 
TENANTS. I BELIEVE THERE WAS A LEASE TO HOWELL FAINTS OUT 
THERE, AND IT MAY, IN FACT, HAVE RELATED TO THEIR SPACE. 
Q IF YOU WILL LOOK AT THAT EXHIBIT YOU HAVE GOT IN 
YOUR RIGHT HAND RIGHT NOW. NOTE, IT DOES SAY THAT THE LIEN 
IS FOR LINOLEUM THAT WAS INSTALLED AT HCWELLS PAINTS? 
A OKAY, WE WERE FROVIDED AT ONE POINT A LIST OF ALL 
RENTERS AND TENANTS. 
1 Q WOULD IT AFFECT THAT THE MELLEN LIEN WAS FOR 
2 I LINOLEUM IN ONE OF THE SO-CALLED TENANT SPACES HAVE BEEN 
SIGNIFICANT TO YOU IN CONSIDERING WHETHER OR NOT YOU NEED TO 
4 I DO, TAKE ANY ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THAT LIEN IN FOLLOWING 
5 I THE ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS? 
A WELL, IT MAY HAVE. IF I WERE PROVIDED WITH SOME 
FORM OF EVIDENCE THAT, IN FACT, THERE WAS A LEASE IN 
EXISTENCE, AND THAT THE LIEN COULD ONLY ATTACH TO THAT SPACE 
INSOFAR AS THE IMPROVEMENTS AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF THAT 
10 I TENANT, IT MAY HAVE HAD SOME BEARING. I CAN'T SAY AT THIS 
11 DATE. 
12 Q THE TOWER LOAN AND THE SIGNATURE CLOSING TOOK 
13 PLACE ON MARCH 13TH OF '85. THE DOCUMENTS WERE NOT RECORDED 
14 FOR ANOTHER WEEK UNTIL MARCH 20TH OF '85. DO YOU HAVE ANY 
15 KNOWLEDGE OF WHY THE WEEK DELAY OCCURRED BETWEEN THE 
16 SIGNATURE CLOSING AND THE RECORDING OF THE DOCUMENTS? 
17 A NO. YOU WILL NOTE AGAIN THAT I ACCEPTED THESE 
18 DOCUMENTS ON MARCH 18TH. SINCE THEY WERE RECORDED ON MARCH 
19 20TH, I HAVE TO ASSUME AT THIS DATE THAT I WAS FRC3A3LY 
20 COMPLYING WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO RECORDING. 
21 Q WE TALKED ABOUT THE MELLEN LIEN. MOVING NOW TO 
22 THE HARPER EXCAVATING LIEN, IS IT YOUR TESTIMONY THAT YOU HAD 
23 NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THAT LIEN, LET'S SAY, CN 
24 MARCH 1STH, WHEN YOU ACCEPTED THE ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS? 
25 I A I DON'T RECALL. I DON'T KNOW. I WILL NOTE THAT 
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IT WAS ON THIS ONE CHANGE SHEET HERE. WHICH, YOU KNOW, 
THERE'S NO DESIGNATION THAT THIS APPLIES TO Tli/il' SAMh 1AM . 
HOWEVER, I REALLY CAN'T TESTIFY. THERE AGAIN, THE CHANGE 
SHEET WOULD BE HELPFUL IF YOU CAN PRODUCE THAT. 
Q IF YOU HAD DISCOVERED THE HARPER EXCAVATING LIEN, 
LET'S SAY, ON OR ABOUT MARCH 18TH, WHICH WAS THE DAY YOU 
ACCEPTED THE ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS AND A COUPLE OF DAYS AFTER 
THE HARFER EXCAVATING LIEN HAS 3EEN FILED, WHAT WOULD YOU 
HAVE DONE IN THIS, TO YOUR TRANSACTION WITH RESPECT rJ O rIHE 
10 | HARPER EXCAVATING LIEN? 
11 | A COPIES OF IT WOULD HAVE BEEN PROVIDED, BOTH 1L 
12 |WOOD3URY'S, AND TO BUILDMART, STEVE URRY, SHIRL WRIGHT, AND 
13 ( EVERYTHING WCULD HAVE BEEN PLACED IN ABEYANCE, IF YOU WILL, 
14 | UNTIL SUCH TIMS AS IT COULD BE PLACED IN THIS CONDITION. 
15 | Q DID YOU UNDERSTAND IT TO 3E ONE OF YOUR DUTIES III 
16 | FOLLOWING THE ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS TO FIND OUT ABOUT LIENS 
17 | LIKE THE HARPER EXCAVATING LIEN BEFORE THE TOWER DOCUMENTS 
18 | WERE RECORDED? 
19 | A MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT I NEEDED TO DELIVER A 
:0 I POLICY IN THE CONDITION THAT IS ACCEPTABLE TO TCWER, AND THAT 
21 I WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THESE EXCEPTIONS, AND NO OTHERS. 
22 | 0 HAVE YOU REVIEWED THOSE EXCEPTIONS, AND ARE YOU 
23 | ABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE HARPER EXCAVATING LIEN 
!4 | WAS CN'E OF THE EXCEPTIONS LISTED? 
25 I A THE HARPER WAS NOT ONE OF EXCEPTIONS LISTED, 
1 Q SO MY QUESTION IS, WOULD YOU HAVE CONSIDERED IT OR 
2 I UNDERSTOOD IT TO BE ONE OF YOUR DUTIES TO DISCOVER THAT LOAN, 
IN SOME MANNER DEAL WITH IT, BEFORE THE RECORDING OF THE 
TOWER DOCUMENTS? 
A YES. 
6 I Q AND DO YOU HAVE AN EXPLANATION AS TO WHY IT WASN'T 
7 I DISCOVERED AND DEALT WITH IN RELATION TO THE FILING OR THE 
RECORDING OF THE DOCUMENTS? 
A I DO NOT KNOW THAT IT WAS NOT DISCOVERED, AND I DO 
10 I NOT KNOW THAT IT WAS NOT DEALT WITH. I DON'T HAVE ANY 
11 DOCUMENTATION. 
12 Q AND YOU DON'T HAVE ANY INDEPENDENT RECOLLECTION? 
13 A NO, I DON'T. 
14 Q OF THE HARPER EXCAVATING LIEN? 
15 A NO, I DON'T. 
16 Q YOU HAVE MENTIONED THAT YOU TALKED TO JEFF 
17 WOODBURY ON ONE OCCASION, AND YOU RECALL AT LEAST GOING TO 
18 HIS OFFICE. IT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN JEFF WOODBURY THAT YOU GOT 
19 THE DOCUMENTS FROM, AND I MAY HAVE ASKED YOU THIS BEFORE. IF 
20 I HAVE, I APOLOGIZE. DO YOU RECALL TALKING TO JEFF WOODBURY 
21 ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF THE STAKER LIEN OR THE NATIONAL 
22 PLUMBING AND HEATING LIEN? 
23 A I DON'T RECALL. 
24 Q DO YOU REMEMBER TALKING TO ANY30DY AT 
25 RICHARDS-WOODBURY ABOUT THE EXISTENCE CF THOSE LIENS? 
1 DOCUMENTS AT ALL TO GREG SEAL? 
2 A THAT'S VERY POSSIBLE. GREG REPRESENTED BOTH STEVE 
3 URRY AND SHIRL, PRIMARILY SHIRL, I BELIEVE, ON MANY LEGAL 
4 MATTERS, AND HAD FOR SOME TIME, I THINK. I FIRST MET GREG 
5 WHILE I WAS WORKING AT GUARDIAN. 
6 AND, IN FACT, I THINK I EVEN DID ONE TRANSACTION 
7 FCR GREG PERSONALLY ON SOME PROPERTY HE OWNED. IT'S VERY 
8 POSSIBLE AS TIME WENT ALONG THAT, FROM TIME TO TIME, I WOULD 
9 PROVIDE HIM WITH COPIES OF, MAYBE LIENS OR WHATEVER. 
10 Q IF YOU PROVIDED HIM COPIES OF LIENS, WHAT WAS YOUR 
11 PURPOSE IN DOING SO? 
12 A IF HE ASKED FOR COPIES OF SOMETHING ON ANY 
13 PARTICULAR PROJECT THAT SHIRL WAS INVOLVED IN, I WOULD GET 
14 THEM FCR HIM, PROVIDE THEM TO HIM. THAT WAS NOT A DAY-TC-DAY 
15 OCCURRENCE. THAT WAS SOMETHING, THAT, YOU KNOW, WAS DONE OUT 
16 OF COURTESY TO GREG. 
17 Q DO YOU RECALL HIM SPECIFICALLY ASKING FOR COPIES 
18 CF ANY DOCUMENTS AS THEY RELATED TO THE TOWER LOAN? 
19 A NO, I DON'T RECALL. 
20 Q WITHOUT ASKING TO 3E A LAWYER, DID YCU HAVE A 
21 GENERAL UNDERSTANDING CF MECHANICS LIEN LAW IN UTAH IN EARLY 
22 '85? 
23 A YES. 
24 Q DID YOU UNDERSTAND IN EARLY "85 BEFORE THE TCWER 
25 LOAN CLOSED THAT THE STATE OF LAW IN UTAH WAS SUCH THAT 
1 MECHANICS LIENS LOANS COULD RELATE BACK UNTIL THE TIME OF THE 
2 FIRST WORK ON THE PROJECT? 
3 A YES, I THINK I ANSWERED THAT IN THE FIRST 
4 DEPOSITION FAIRLY WELL. I TRIED TO. 
5 Q DO YOU REMEMBER THE TOPIC OF MECHANICS LIENS 
6 RELATING BACK OR THAT KIND OF A DISCUSSION OCCURRING WITH 
7 RESPECT TO THE TOWER LOAN TRANSACTION? DID ANYBODY TALK TO 
8 YOU ABOUT THAT ISSUE? 
9 A NOT THAT I RECALL. I HAD DEALT IN TITLE, WELL, AT 
10 THAT TIME, IT HAD TO BE CLOSE TO TEN YEARS, TEN, ELEVEN 
11 YEARS, AND HAD NUMEROUS EXPOSURES TO LIENS, MECHANICS LIENS, 
12 COMMERCIAL PROJECTS, MULTIPLE RESIDENTIAL. IT WAS HARDLY A 
13 TOPIC WHICH WAS NEW TO ME. 
14 Q WERE YOU A PARTY TO ANY CONVERSATIONS AMONG ANY CF 
15 THE PRINCIPALS OR THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE TOWER LOAN 
16 TRANSACTION WHERE MECHANICS LIENS WERE DISCUSSED? 
17 A AS I HAD INDICATED, I SPCKE WITH STEVE URRY 
18 REGARDING THAT STAXER ONE, AND ACTUALLY STEVE HAD HAD A 
19 HEATED CONVERSATION WITH STAKER, I RECALL, ON THE PHONE. 
20 Q OTHER THAN THAT, DO YOU RECALL ANY OTHER 
21 DISCUSSIONS? 
22 A ONCE AGAIN, THE ONE WITH SHIRL IN COMPLEX 
23 FABRICATORS, FABRICATION, WHATEVER THAT IS. IT'S HARD FOR ME 
24 TO RECALL SPECIFIC DATES. 
25 (DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 13 IS MARKED FOR 
wnr^Y MOHNTITVJ vppnsTTMr. ^FSVTTF INC. 6 8 
2 
3 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
IDENTIFICATION.) 
Q 
MARKED 
A 
(BY MR. DRAKE) TIM, LET ME SHOW 
D-13. CAN YOU IDENTIFY THAT FOR THE 
THAT IS THE LOAN POLICY TO TOWER 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION. 
Q 
THAT Tl 
A 
Q 
DO YOU REMEMBER ASSISTING IN THE 
TLE POLICY? 
I WOULD HAVE ASSISTED. 
HAVE YOU HAD A CHANCE TO REVIEW 
EXCEPTIONS THAT ARE LISTED ON THE POLICY? 
A 
) 
YOU WHAT'S BEEN 
RECORD, PLEASE? 
FEDERAL SAVINGS 
PREPARATION OF 
IT FOR THE 
I WILL. DO YOU WANT ME TO REFERENCE THOSE WITH 
THE COMMITMENT? 
°-
A 
Q 
JUST TAKE A LOOK AT IT. 
OKAY. 
IS IT FAIR TO SAY THAT THE EXCEPTIONS IN THE 
INFORMATION ON EXHIBIT D-13 THERE REFLECT WHAT YOU BELIEVE TO 
BE THE 
AS OF 1 
A 
ISSUED 
Q 
A 
Q 
HARPER 
j HARPER 
CURRENT STATE OF THE TITLE ON THE BUILDMART PROPERTY 
'HE DATE OF THAT POLICY? 
I HAVE TO BELIEVE THAT THEY DID, 
A POLICY ON IT. 
AND IF YOU HAD DISCOVERED THAT -
WELL, MAY I? 
YOU HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO REVIEW 
EXCAVATING LIEN. APE YOU ABLE TO TE 
EXCAVATING LIEN IS LISTED AS AN EXCE 
INASMUCH AS WE 
-
D-12. D-ll IS THE 
LL WHETHER THE 
PTION ON D-13? 
1 A NO, I DID NOT SEE IT ON THERE. 
2 Q IF IT'S NOT, CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHY IT'S NOT 
3 REFLECTED ON THERE? 
4 A NO, I CANNOT. 
5 Q IF IT WAS IN EXISTENCE AS OF MARCH 14TH, IT STATES 
6 IT WAS RECORDED, AND IF IT WAS VALID, IF IT DESCRIBED THE 
7 BUILDMART MALL POLICY, WAS IT A MISTAKE TO HAVE NOT INCLUDED 
8 THE HARPER EXCAVATING LIEN AS AN EXCEPTION TO D-13? 
9 A UNLESS IT HAD BEEN — 
10 MR. ORITT: OBJECTION. 
11 THE WITNESS: UNLESS IT HAD BEEN DEALT WITH IN THE 
12 TRANSACTION. I HAVE TO ASSUME SINCE IT'S NOT APPEARING HERE, 
13 THAT IN SOME MANNER IT WAS DEALT WITH. 
14 Q (BY MR. DRAKE) AND WHAT WOULD THE SO-CALLED 
15 MANNERS OF DEALING WITH THE LIEN LIKE THAT HAVE BEEN SO FAR 
16 AS YOU ARE CONCERNED? 
17 A RELEASING IT, PAYING IT OFF. 
18 Q ANY OTHER WAYS IT COULD HAVE BEEN DEALT WITH THAT 
19 WOULD HAVE BEEN A MANNER ACCEPTABLE TO YCU? 
20 A IT WOULD HAVE TO BE RELEASED IN SCME FASHION. 
21 CONSIDERATION MAY NOT HAVE TO BE SPECIFICALLY $84,0C0, THE 
22 AMOUNT CLAIMED, BUT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE RELEASED AS FAR AS 
23 THE PROPERTY GOES. THERE AGAIN, THE FILE, AND I CANNOT 
24 I RECALL WHETHER WE EVEN HANDLED ANY FUNDS, THE FILE WOULD 
PROBABLY DISCLOSE WHETHER THERE WAS IN ANY FASHION SOMETHING 
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DONE WITH THIS. I WOULD HAVE TO ASSUME THERE WAS. 
Q DID YOU CONSIDER AS PART OF YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES 
IN WRITING THE TITLE POLICY, D-13, TO REPORT THE EXISTENCE OF 
LIENS AS OF MARCH 20TH, 1985 TO RlCHARDS-WOODBURY OR ANYONE 
ELSE? 
A CERTAINLY THE RECORDING WOULD NOT HAVE GONE ON 
RECORD IF THIS WERE IN EFFECT. 
Q BY THIS, YOU HAVE REFERRED TO D-ll, THE HARPER 
EXCAVATING LIEN? 
A YES. 
Q IT IS THE SAME? 
A PROVIDED THAT DOES, IN FACT, COVER THIS PROPERTY. 
Q I UNDERSTAND. DOES THE SAME HOLD TRUE FOR OTHER 
LIENS? IN OTHER WORDS, IF THEY WERE VALID LIENS AGAINST THE 
3UILDMART MALL PROPERTY AS OF MARCH 20TH, 1985 THAT HAD NOT 
BEEN SATISFIED CR TAKEN CARE OF, RELEASED IN SOME MANNER 
ACCEPTABLE TO YOU, DID YOU UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HAD AN 
OBLIGATION TO REPORT THOSE? 
A CERTAINLY. 
Q TO WHOM WOULD YOU HAVE UNDERSTOOD THAT YOU WOULD 
HAVE REPORTED THOSE? 
A GIVEN THE LETTER OF INSTRUCTION, TO HAVE TO GO TO 
JEFF WOODBURY, AT LEAST JEFF WOODBURY, PROBABLY THE OTHER 
PARTIES TO THE TRANSACTION TOO. 
Q IN A LITTLE BIT DIFFERENT VEIN, IF THERE HAD BEEN 
A LIEN LIKE THE STAKER PAVING LIEN, FOR INSTANCE, THAT HAD 
BEEN OF RECORD AND THEN RELEASED PRIOR TO THE CLOSING, DID 
YOU UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HAD ANY OBLIGATION TO REPORT THE 
EXISTENCE OF THAT STAKER LIEN TO ANYONE AS PART OF YOUR DUTY 
IN THE TRANSACTION? 
A WELL, LAWYERS WOULD HAVE BEEN PROBABLY ADVISED OF 
IT, YOU KNOW, THAT THE LIEN WAS THERE BUT RELEASED. YOU 
KNOW, THAT COULD HAVE OCCURRED. BEYOND THAT, TO THE 
PRINCIPALS THEMSELVES, NO, I DON'T KNOW THAT THERE WOULD HAVE 
BEEN ANY OBLIGATION. 
PART OF THE REASON FOR GETTING THE INDEMNITY 
AGREEMENT WAS FOR THAT ASSURANCE, BOTH AS AN ISSUER AND TO 
THE UNDERWRITER, AND I SUPPOSE SOME CROSSOVER TO PROTECT THE 
OTHER PARTIES INVOLVED THAT THERE WEREN'T ANY LIENS OR ANY 
POTENTIAL LIENS. 
Q DID I UNDERSTAND YOU TO SAY THAT YOU WOULD HAVE 
UNDERSTOOD YOU HAD AN OBLIGATION TO REPORT TO THE LAWYERS? 
A LAWYERS TITLE, I MAY HAVE DISCUSSED IT WITH. AND 
THAT MAY HAVE BEEN, THAT PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN HAL MAYES 
AT THAT TIME BUT, YOU KNOW, I DON'T RECALL EXACTLY. 
Q DID YOU UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HAD ANY OBLIGATION TO 
REPORT THE EXISTENCE OF LIENS LIKE STAKER PAVING, THESE OTHER 
LOANS TO GREG SEAL IN THIS TRANSACTION? 
A IN THIS TRANSACTION, I CAN'T RECALL WHAT, WAS GREG 
REPRESENTING BUILDMART OR SHIRL OR WHO? 
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Q HE WAS COUNSEL FOR BUILDMART IN THE LOAN AND WAS 
THE AUTHOR OF THE ATTORNEY'S OPINION IN THE TRANSACTION. 
A I DON'T RECALL THE ATTORNEY'S OPINION. I SUPPOSE 
IF I WERE MADE AWARE OF OUTSTANDING LIENS OR BELIEVED THERE 
TO BE POTENTIAL LIENS THERE, GIVEN ANY TYPE OF NOTICE, VERBAL 
6 I OR OTHERWISE, THAT SOMEONE'S INTENT TO FILE A LIEN, I WOULD 
7 I PROBABLY HAVE CONTACTED, RATHER THAN GREG, UNLESS I HAPPEN TO 
BE RIGHT IN CONSTANT COMMUNICATION WITH THEM, PROBABLY SHIRL 
OR STEVE URRY INSOFAR AS BUILDMART GOES. DOES THAT ANSWER 
10 I YOUR QUESTION? 
11 Q YES. WOULD YOU HAVE CONTACTED ANYONE ELSE? JEFF 
12 WOODBURY, FOR INSTANCE? 
13 A IF IT WERE AROUND THE TIME OF THIS LETTER HERE, 
14 YES, MOST DEFINITELY, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE INSTRUCTIONS OF 
15 THE LETTER, IF I BELIEVED ANY LIENS WERE IN EXISTENCE OR 
16 POTENTIAL LIENS COULD BE FILED. 
17 Q AND YOU HAVE MENTIONED, I THINK, IN THE CONTEXT CF 
18 THE HARPER EXCAVATING LIEN, IF YOU HAD KNOWN THAT WAS IN 
19 EXISTENCE AT THE TIME THE DOCUMENTS WERE RECORDED, YOU 
20 UNDERSTOOD YOU WOULD HAVE PROVIDED A COPY CF THAT TO JEFF 
21 WOODBURY AND NOTIFIED HIM OF THE EXISTENCE OF THAT LIEN? 
22 A YES. 
23 Q AND THE SAME HOLDS TRUE FOR OTHER LIENS THAT WOULD 
24 HAVE BEEN CF RECORD? 
25 A YES. ANY POTENTIAL LIENS, EVEN IF IT WAS STATED 
1 TO ME OF SOMEONE'S INTENT TO FILE A LIEN, I WOULD PASS THIS 
2 ALONG. 
3 Q AND THE SAME IS NOT NECESSARILY TRUE OF GREG SEAL 
4 THEN? YOUR TESTIMONY IS YOU MIGHT HAVE CONTACTED STEVE URRY 
5 OR SHIRL WRIGHT AS OPPOSED TO MR. SEAL? 
6 A GREG AND I WERE NOT IN A DAY-TO-DAY COMMUNICATION 
7 WITH EACH OTHER. IF GREG NEEDED SOME PARTICULAR INFORMATION, 
8 HE WOULD CALL ME AND ASK ME FOR IT. IF I KNEW THERE WAS 
9 SOMETHING THAT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY A PROBLEM FOR HIM, I 
10 WOULD PROVIDE IT WITH HIM. BUT BARRING THAT, YOU KNOW, THERE 
11 WAS NO REQUEST TO. AND SO NORMALLY I DEALT WITH STEVE URRY 
12 OR SHIRL WRIGHT, AND MOSTLY IT WAS SHIRL WRIGHT. 
13 Q OTHER THAN THE ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS THAT WE HAVE 
14 TALKED ABOUT, DID JEFF WOODBURY EVER MAKE AN EXPRESSED 
15 REQUEST TO YOU ALONG THE LINES, WE WANT TO KNOW OF THE 
16 EXISTENCE OF EVERY LIEN ON THIS PROPERTY? 
17 A NOT THAT I EVER RECALL. 
18 Q DID ANYBODY ON BEHALF OF RICHARDS-WOCDBURY OR 
19 TOWER MAKE A SIMILAR REQUEST TO YOU ALONG THE LINES THAT WE 
20 WANT TO BE ADVISED OF EVERY LIEN THAT'S CN THIS PROPERTY 
21 BEFORE WE CLOSE? 
22 A NO, NOT THAT I RECALL. 
23 Q HAVE YOU EVER SEEN GREG SEAL'S ATTORNEY'S OPINION 
24 LETTER? 
25 A I MAY HAVE. I DON'T RECALL IT. IF YOU WANT TO 
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SHOW IT TO 
Q 
MR. SEAL'S 
MINUTE AND 
YOU. 
A 
1 ADDRESSED * 
ME, I WILL TELL YOU WHETHER I HAVE SEEN IT. 
THAT'S EXHIBIT .C TO THE JEFF WOODBURY DEPOSITION, 
LETTER, FOR YOUR REFERENCE, IF YOU WANT TO TAKE A 
LOOK AT IT AND SEE IF IT LOCKS AT ALL FAMILIAR TO 
I DON'T REALLY RECALL EVER SEEING THIS. 
rO ME, NOR IS IT COPIED TO ME. SO THAT 1 
PARTICULARLY SURPRISE ME. IT IS DATED MARCH 13TH, 
HAS A CALE1 
OTHER THAN 
INTERESTED 
MYSELF. 
Q 
THREE-WAY 
^DAR. I DON'T EVEN KNOW WHAT DAY MARCH 
MY BIRTHDAY, AND USUALLY ON MY BIRTHDAY 
IT'S NOT 
DOESN'T 
IF ANYONE 
13TH WAS, 
, I'M NOT 
IN WORKING. SO THAT'S THE ONE DAY I INDULGE 
DO YOU HAVE ANY RECOLLECTION AT ALL OF . 
CONVERSATION WHEN YOU MIGHT HAVE BEEN ON 
j WITH A CONFERENCE CALL WITH JEFF WOODBURY AND GREG 
ANY TIME CLOSE TO THE CLOSING OF THIS TRANSACTION? 
A I REALLY DON'T RECALL THAT. 
MR. DRAKE: I THINK THAT'S ALL I HAVE F 
NOW. I WILL HAVE A COUPLE OF FOLLOW-UP FOR YOU. 
PASS TO THESE GUYS. THANKS, TIM. 
QUICK BREAi 
MR. ORITT: PAUL, BEFORE YOU START, CAN 
K? 
(A RECESS WAS TAKEN.) 
* 
* 
h SO-CALLED 
THE PHONE 
SEAL AT 
OR RIGHT 
BUT LET ME 
WE TAKE A 
1 WOULD HAVE OBTAINED THEM, I DON'T KNOW. SOME OF THESE DATES 
2 GO — THIS IS DECEMBER OF '84, JUNE OF '85. THIS LIS 
3 PENDENS, JUNE OF '85, I WILL POINT OUT THAT. I GUESS, IT'S 
4 JUNE OR IS IT JANUARY? I WAS GOING TO SAY IN JUNE OF '85, 
5 RICHMOND WASN'T EVEN — 
6 Q I BELIEVE IT'S JANUARY, IF YOU LOOK AT IT. 
7 I A SO — 
8 Q WOULD THESE XEROX COPIES BE THE TYPES OF THINGS 
9 THAT WOULD GO IN YOUR 1191-S FILE? 
10 A YES, I WOULD HAVE COPIES OF THESE THINGS. ALSO 
11 THINGS OF THIS NATURE, CORRESPONDENCE, ANYTHING LIKE THAT 
12 WOULD BE IN THERE. 
13 Q I KNOW I ASKED YOU THIS, BUT I HAVE FORGOTTEN WHAT 
14 YOUR RESPONSE WAS. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT YOU DID ACTUALLY 
15 CAUSE THE TOWER DEEDS OF TRUST TO BE RECORDED? DID YOU 
16 RECORD IT YOURSELF? 
17 A I WOULD HAVE TO SAY YES, THAT I PROBABLY DID 
18 RECORD IT. 
19 Q WHEN YOU DID RECORD IT, DID YOU BELIEVE THAT IT 
20 WAS IN SECOND LIEN POSITION TO THE FIRST SECURITY DEEDS OF 
21 TRUST? 
22 A YES. I WOULDN'T HAVE — I WOULD HAVE HAD TO 
23 COMPLY WITH THE LETTER OF INSTRUCTION, AND MY INTERPRETATICN 
24 WOULD BE THAT THEY WOULD BE IN THE SAME POSITION SUBJECT ONLY 
25 TO THOSE EXCEPTIONS THAT THEY HAVE STATED. 
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